


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CONTENTS

A Letter from Bishop Alexander Goss to Ignaz von
Dollinger on the Subject of the Vatican Council

Stephen J. Tonsor 285

James Matthew Thompson: The Martyr of
English Modernism W. Norman Pittenger 291

Some Notes on the Ontology of Paul Tilich .. Wilford O. Cross 297

An Essay on Natural Law Noah Edward Fehl 311

Personalist Christian Metaphysics N. Lossky 331

The Word of God in the Church Paul M. van Buren 344

Notes, Comments and Problems 359

Book Reviews 363

Notes on New Books 377

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FOUNDED IN 1918 BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

VOLUME XXXIX

OCTOBER 1957

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A LETTER FROM BISHOP ALEXANDER GOSS TO IGNAZ VON DOLLINGER ON THE SUBJECT OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL

By STEPHEN J. TONSOR

University of Michigan

The nineteenth century was remarkable for the amount of spiritual tragedy which the great intellectual struggles of that era produced in its keenest religious spirits and most perceptive thinkers. Unlike the leaders of the Reformation era their lives did not end on a note of hope and affirmation but in gloom and prophetic suspicion of the deeper tragedies which lay ahead of the human spirit. Those who, like Pius IX, totally rejected the new spirit of the age with its emphasis upon reason, science, individualism, democracy and the state, found themselves fighting an unequal, and at least for their generation, a foredoomed battle. Those brave men such as the Abbé Lamennais, Ignaz von Döllinger, Lord Acton and even John Henry Newman who attempted a synthesis between reason and science on the one hand and the theology and the institutions of the old Church on the other, found themselves driven into positions they had not anticipated; alienated and alone in a world where the middle ground of moderation had disappeared. Even the religious thinkers who stood outside the orthodox theologies and institutional churches of Western Christianity, men like Nietzsche, Burckhardt and Matthew Arnold, took no comfort in the new age and the bleak and wintery landscape of agnosticism which lay everywhere about them.

For those men who sought moderation, synthesis and harmonious relations with the spirit of science and truth which was abroad in this

age of realism, the General Council of the Vatican, summoned for December 8, 1869, was the great turning point. The triumph of dogma over what many of them believed to be ancient traditions and institutions, together with the new historical disciplines and the sciences, offended and alienated them. But even more offensive to them was what they believed to be the air of dubious morality, engineered majorities, conspiratorial silences and police-state methods which characterized the Roman Curia. No better example of their attitude can be found than a hitherto unpublished letter of January 31, 1870 from Alexander Goss, Roman Catholic bishop of Liverpool, to Ignaz von Döllinger, intellectual leader of the anti-infallibilist forces.¹

Alexander Goss² (b. July 5, 1814), was the son of an old Lancashire Roman Catholic recusant family. His uncle, Henry Rutter, was a Roman priest and provided for his education at Ushaw college, a school attended by many of the sons of old Catholic families because Oxford and Cambridge discouraged attendance and refused degrees to Roman Catholics. He distinguished himself as a student and was appointed "minor professor" at Ushaw, teaching a class in the humanities. At the death of his uncle, Henry Rutter, he received a legacy which he spent studying theology at the English College in Rome. He was ordained a priest on July 4, 1841. He was shortly appointed vice-president of the newly founded college of St. Edward at Everton, near Liverpool. Ten years later he was appointed coadjutor bishop to Dr. Brown and was consecrated by Cardinal Wiseman at Liverpool, September 25, 1853. As his official duties were not pressing he paid another long visit to Rome. On January 25, 1856 he became bishop of Liverpool and continued in this office until his death on October 3, 1872.

He represented the old Catholics of England at their best; frank and open, direct in speech and manner and conservative in politics and religion. That he was influenced by the new historical studies is evidenced by the fact of his interest in the publication of documents and sources; he was editor of *Chronica Regum Mannae et Insularum*, and various essays of an historical nature. That he shared the old Catholic viewpoint of men like John Lingard who could not find historical precedent for the liturgical and institutional changes in English church life

¹Letter from Alexander Goss to Ignaz von Döllinger, Doellingeriana, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Manuscript Division, Munich, Germany. Spellings are as in the original.

²For further biographical information see *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XXII (London, 1890), pp. 256 f., and *Catholic Encyclopedia*, VI (New York, 1909), p. 663.

which came when the Papacy reasserted its power in the nineteenth century, is evident from the letter below.

The vanity of the honest rebellion of Alexander Goss against what he thought Rome had become in 1870 is evidenced by the fact that, as did the other bishops of the "minority," he accepted the proclamation of papal infallibility. It was Archbishop Manning, "the artful manager," who triumphed and ironically when Bishop Goss died in 1872 it was Manning who preached his funeral sermon.

Ignaz von Döllinger was born February 28, 1799.³ History will probably see more significance in the fact that he was the father of Catholic historicism and the mentor and life-long friend and confidant of Lord Acton than that he was the leader in the struggle inside the Roman Catholic Church against the doctrine of papal infallibility.

Döllinger had been born into the academic life, for his father had been an anatomist and embryologist and when the University of Munich was founded in 1826, Döllinger, then a young priest, soon found his way as church historian into its conservative and ultramontane faculty. Under the influence of Franz von Baader (1765-1841) and Joseph Görres (1776-1848), Döllinger worked hard to defend the Catholic, conservative and ultramontane position with the help of the new historical discipline. He found, however, that it was increasingly difficult to be an ultramontane priest and a sound historical scholar at the same time and the increasing power of the papacy, the proclamation of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, and the revival of neo-scholasticism, alienated him increasingly from the papal camp. As the Vatican Council shaped up after 1860 he was clearly the leader of the anti-infallibilist forces. It is for this reason that Bishop Goss addresses the remarks of this letter to Döllinger.

Döllinger, too, was doomed to ultimate frustration. After the proclamation of papal infallibility he was given a short time to consider his stand on the dogma. When he adamantly refused to accept the doctrine he was, on April 17, 1871, excommunicated by the Archbishop of Munich. For a while he became a leader in the German Old Catholic movement but when the Old Catholics introduced what Döllinger considered to be innovations, Döllinger parted company with them, for he, after his conservative fashion, was certain that it was better to

³For further information see Johann Friedrich, *Ignaz von Döllinger*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1901), and Stephen Tonsor, *Ignaz von Döllinger, A Study in Catholic Historicism*, unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Illinois.

remain a schismatic than to become a heretic. He died on January 13, 1890.

Hotel Beau Sejour, Cannes, Jan. 31, 1870.
Private & Confidential

My dear Provost Doellinger

I don't know whether you will remember two stout English priests being introduced to you by Mr. Roby at Munich in the month of June 1846. One of them died last year, the other who is now writing to you is Bishop of Liverpool. Preparing to set out for the Council—meeting of Bps⁴—at Rome, he was struck by cold at the visitation of a church, & after being in bed for six weeks was ordered by his medical doctors to go to Cannes. He arrived hardly able to walk but is now improved, yet is forbidden all labour, mental or physical.

The object of my present letter is two-fold. 1^o to express my sympathy with you in the violent & scurrilous attacks upon you in the Ultramontain Press & 2^o—to make some inquiry about the Bishoprick of the Island of Man, lying between England and Ireland which forms part of my Diocese of Liverpool. If the council has to represent or give utterance to the traditions derived from Apostolic teaching floating in the Church, I think it ought to include others besides Bishops & even such Bishops give [altered to bear witness to] not their own
 bear witness to

fancies, but the traditions of their church. When the late Archbp of Paris⁵ was asked about the Immaculate Conception he said I believe it. I was taught it at my mother's knee: but if you want to know the teaching of my church it is against it & he put in one of the strongest arguments against it, & thereby lost caste in Rome. Now Archbishop Manning who is making himself so forward in the Infallibility question knows little of the traditions of England. Our old controversialists refused to defend it, alleging that it was not an article of Catholic faith & Archbp Manning, when a Protestant declared from his pulpit that the Roman Pontiff should never hold power in England. He is not a scholar like Newman, but an artful manager: he was so amongst Protestants; he is so still. Both yourself and Newman ought

⁴The obvious intention of the phrase "meeting of bishops" is the denial of ecumenicity of the Council.

⁵Bishop Goss probably has Archbishop Maria Domin. Aug. Sibor of Paris (1848-1857), in mind here.

to have been specially invited to the Council. The antecedents of both required it. Dr. Newman was asked, but in such a way as to insure his refusal. Rome is not satisfied with having us good Catholics but it wants to denationalise us and make us Italian. The history of every episcopate during the Middle Ages is a history of struggles against the avarice or encroachments of Rome: even St. Thomas a Becket of Canterbury declared that it was as difficult for a Bishop to find justice in the court of Rome as for our Lord to find it in the court of Herod or Pilate.

Even as it now stands the Episcopate is gone to the dogs. Bishops are treated like children and are forbidden to read this or that book like boys in a nursery & Rome thinks to pacify them by patting them on the cheek when they go to an audience. The Pope has reserved much of their powers to himself, & every privilege conceded to Regulars—which has generally been conceded by Popes who were Regulars—is a curtailment of the Bps rights. In our country, as also in Ireland & America we have no courts, & yet we cannot bring an ecclesiastic before secular courts, even for secular crimes. He might be using for himself moneys collected for a church or he might keep a chapel house for his own use & yet he could not be restrained except by an appeal to Rome, when it would be too late to remedy the evil—the list of excommunications issued by the Pope *sustintine latae* is fritful to read: they should one and all be replaced & contumacious sinners dealt with separately. The retaining and publishing of them only irritates & will lead in England & Ireland to the exclusion of religious teaching in all schools aided by government. Besides in appeals to Rome, the decisions given in Propagands are not according to any known case: they decide what they think best & make up conscientiously for deficiencies by the Popes supposed absolute dominion over all ecclesiastical property—Practically the selection of Bps is entirely in the Pope's hands & most of the chapters who have the privilege of suggesting the names in alphabetical order are appointed by him. When a bishop has an audience he has to kiss the Pope's shoe, just as his valet has to do, and yet he calls him "Frater." Practically the Pope knows nothing of business done in his name & the Prefect of Propaganda as well as presidents of some of the Congregations of the Council, is not a bishop tho a Cardinal. Why should Cardinals be allowed any precedence *out* of Rome to which they locally belong—and if the States of the Church belong to the Universal Catholic World, as the Pope has in an allocution or other pointed document declared, why is not the Catholic world

allowed to interfere for their better government? I think the Pope ought to be restricted as supreme administrator to observance of the Canons of Gen. Councils, whereas now he has practically set himself above the council: the bishops are like a set of pupils under their pedagogue, and as the pedagogue has his pupils to swear obedience, so the Pope has the Bull *Apostoli sedis* or *Latae sustintine* excommunications: a sovereign might as well set up a guillotine in the Parliament house—Archbp. Errington⁶ was deprived of his right to succession to Westminster by Pius IX without the allegation of even the suspicion of a crime. You should get a copy of his case, which he has in print; any German Bishop could get one from him: he is staying at San Clemente Rome. I am glad to see that the Berlin Correspondent of the Times has sent your remarks on the [illegible word] for Infallibility. I wish Lord Acton would translate other articles for the Times from the Augsburg Gazette—I am glad to be spared by sickness the humiliation of not being at the council.

[Here follows a long discussion of the history of the jurisdiction of the Isle of Man.]

I see the Times correspondent from Rome citing some provincial councils—Westminster, Baltimore, Castel—are committed to infallibility; I don't think so—their adhesion to their head implies no more than submission to his command. Besides the members of a Prov. Council do not vote in favour of decrees passed by a majority—Yet I think it would be arch if the weight of this argument were got around by a dissection of the evidence adduced in the appendix of the Postulatum. I speak of what I have not seen & what I know only from the newspapers—I am not and can not be in any confidential correspondence with Bps in Rome, as my letters would likely be opened—as it

⁶For further information concerning Archbishop George Errington (1804-1886), see *Dictionary of National Biography*, XVII (London, 1889), p. 398. Giles Lyton Stachey in *Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, General Gordon* (London, 1918), gives a very amusing by highly spiced account of the Errington case. It is interesting to note that although he was a rather important figure in nineteenth century Roman Catholic history, Archbishop Errington is not included in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* although lesser figures are given more than ample space. Errington was made coadjutor bishop to Cardinal Wiseman in March 1855. In April 1855 he was translated to the Archbisprie of Trebizon *in partibus* and upon the death of Cardinal Wiseman he would have become his successor as Archbishop of Westminster. Largely through the shameless intrigues of Manning, Errington was removed from his see by Pius IX on July 2, 1862. Twice thereafter Pius IX attempted a reconciliation with Errington by offering him important sees but on each occasion Errington refused. Bishop Goss seems to have acted somewhat as the protector of Archbishop Errington as he placed Errington in charge of the missions on the Island of Man.

is my letters treating only of Personal matters don't always reach their destination. The Times will print anything but it must have a name as a guarantee of good faith.

[Goss sends his sympathy and apologizes for the slovenly letter; slovenly on account of sympathy.]

ALEXANDER GOSS

JAMES MATTHEW THOMPSON: THE MARTYR OF ENGLISH MODERNISM

By W. NORMAN PITTEANGER

General Theological Seminary

Announcement was made in British newspapers last autumn (October, 1956) of the death of the Reverend James Matthew Thompson, M.A. (Oxon.), at the age of seventy-eight. Probably the name of J. M. Thompson means very little to the present generation; yet he was the man who, in the phrase coined by Dr. Henry D. A. Major, former Principal of Ripon Hall in Oxford, was "the martyr" of English Modernism. To some of us, his writings on biblical, critical and theological matters have been of considerable importance, although they were published in the first two decades of this century. And his experiences as a theology don at Oxford, while unknown to many today, are part of the annals of English Church history in the twentieth century. A brief sketch of his life, the experiences which caused Dr. Major to describe him as "martyr," and his religious writing, may therefore be of some interest today.

Thompson was born in 1878, the son of the Reverend H. L. T. Thompson, then vicar of Iron Acton in Gloucestershire. His father had at one time been Student and Censor of Christ Church in Oxford, later Warden of Radley, and for a time vicar of St. Mary's (the University Church) in Oxford. His mother was Catherine Paget, eldest daughter of Sir James Paget; thus Thompson was a relation of the great Bishop of Oxford, Francis Paget, some of whose devotional and theological works are still known and read. After attending Winchester School as a scholar, Thompson went up to Oxford, where he was Junior

Student at Christ Church. He received a "first class" in "Greats" (the school of *Litterae Humaniores*) and a "second" in the Theology School, and was designated as Liddon Student in Theology.

Following his ordination to the ministry of the Church of England, he spent a year as curate at St. Frideswide's, the Christ Church Mission in Poplar, in the East End of London. But he returned to Oxford in 1904, having been elected Fellow of Magdalen College in that year. He continued as Fellow of Magdalen until 1938. From 1906 to 1915, he was Dean of Divinity at Magdalen—in charge of the studies of men taking theology. His tenure of this post was terminated in 1915, following inhibition from ministerial functions, first by Dr. Talbot, the Bishop of Winchester (Visitor of Magdalen and hence "ordinary" of the college) and then by Dr. Gore, Bishop of Oxford, because of what were considered by these prelates to be his heretical views. Thompson did not give up his orders; his name is still in Crockford for 1955-56. He remained at Magdalen, becoming Home Bursar in 1920, a post he held until 1927; Vice-President of the college from 1935 to 1937; and, on his retirement from active duties, Honorary Fellow in 1944. After his inhibition by the two bishops, he turned his attention increasingly away from biblical critical and theological studies to modern French history, and during the period from 1920 until he ended his teaching, he lectured in this subject, serving also from time to time as university examiner both at Oxford and at Cambridge. In 1913, he had married Meri Meredyth Jones, daughter of the Reverend David Jones, vicar of Penmaenmawyr in Wales; all his life Thompson was a devoted hiker and climber in the hills of the principality.

What now about his experience as a "heretic?"

While an examining chaplain to the Bishop of Gloucester (a post he held from 1905 to 1910, when he resigned after the furore stirred up by his writings), Thompson published a volume entitled *The Gospel According to St. Mark*. As a student of Dr. Sanday, the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Oxford, he had become interested in the synoptic problem; his book was a study of the Markan gospel as the earliest account of the life of Jesus. It is a vivid portrayal of our Lord's impact upon his disciples, with chapters discussing the Lord's teaching, ethical and religious; the probable biographical details of Jesus' career; the "mighty works" attributed to him; and the evangelist's interpretation of the significance of his person. The book was on the whole favourably reviewed; but the chapter on the miracles attributed to Jesus was attacked by many whose views were more conservative. A

few years later, Thompson published *The Miracles of the New Testament*. With this volume, the storm broke. For Thompson had gone to the lengths of saying: "Though no miracles accompanied his entry into, or presence in, or departure from the world; though he did not think or speak or act otherwise than as a man; though he yields nothing to historical analysis but human elements; yet in Jesus Christ God is Incarnate—discovered and worshipped, as God alone can be, by the insight of faith" (p. 217).

The purpose of the book was the examination of the stories of the miraculous in the entire New Testament. He was convinced that a careful study demonstrates that miracle, in its commonly accepted sense of "violation of the order of nature by divine intervention" (a definition which, interestingly enough, C. S. Lewis accepts in his book on *Miracles*, although most philosophical writers have long since discarded it), belongs to the interpretation, rather than to the facts, of the earliest Christian tradition. He believed that such a study shows that "the stories of Jesus' miracles" are "misunderstandings or misrepresentations"—in perfectly good faith, of course—of the events of our Lord's life. The same he found to be true of the Pauline miracles. As to the Virgin Birth, he claimed that it is a legend which has been given "theological significance;" while as to the Empty Tomb stories, he described them as "an appendix," legendary in nature, but not a "corollary," of "the fact that Jesus has been seen and can be experienced as a living person—though the form of the Appearances must at present remain uncertain" (pp. 208-211).

As I have said, the storm broke. Thompson's inhibition followed, but not before many articles had been written, several books published, and a number of series of lectures given both at Oxford and Cambridge, either attacking or commending Thompson's views. All this was in 1911 and 1912. In the latter year, Dr. H. Hensley Henson, then vicar of St. Margaret's, Westminster, London, and later Bishop of Durham, invited Thompson to give the St. Margaret's Lectures in that famous parish church—lectures attended each year by large crowds of Londoners and always given by distinguished Christian scholars and leaders. Thompson's lectures were entitled *Through Facts to Faith*. They were published immediately after delivery and only added to the storm of protest.

In the lectures, Thompson developed his theme—that miracle, in the accepted sense of "violation of the order of nature" is an incubus on religion and "does more than damage the Christian doctrine of the

Incarnation: sooner or later it perverts all true religion" (*Miracles*, p. 217),—with special reference to providence, prayer, the theology of the Incarnation, and the meaning of redemption. Whatever one may think of Thompson's position, *Through Facts to Faith* is a deeply moving book. In a way, it is a *confessio fidei* from one who is under attack, who is suffering from denunciation as a non-Christian, and who is seeking to make his way of holding the faith at least understandable to those who would deny his right to the Christian name.

In essence, the book says that when we have conceded to historical, critical, scientific, study the right to investigate to the limit the "facts" which are their proper province, we are still able, through faith, to affirm that the heart of the Christian position is true, and that by sharing "the experience of those to whom Jesus Christ is God, through worshipping him, praying to him, and following the steps of his most holy life," we can like them "reach the Christian faith" (*Through Facts*, p. 149).

In essays in various periodicals, notably *The Hibbert Journal* and *The Modern Churchman*, for both of which Thompson was a frequent contributor and reviewer, the same line of thought is developed—perhaps most notably in what was Thompson's last essay on a theological subject, "The Christian Faith" (*Hibbert Journal*, Dec. 1918). In this essay, the author carries to a conclusion his thesis that the Christian evaluation of Jesus Christ as divine rests on the belief "that God's love for the world, and his will for its redemption, fulfils itself, not through Jesus' life uninterpreted by us, nor through our religious sense unaided by his revelation of God, but through the unique result of his life and our faith meeting together." The last paragraph of the essay may be quoted in full, as summing up his position: "This does not mean that we are to give up the historical defence of Christian faith in favour of a pragmatic argument from religious experience. The kind of historical argument we must distrust is one which tries to prove too much, and by its failure compromises our whole apologetic. We could never substantiate, and soon we shall no longer believe in, the miraculous figure which is at once the Jesus of history and the Christ of devotion: but we can prove beyond question that Jesus is worthy to be the source and the continual inspiration of the Christian faith: and we are able to meet the charge that our faith is illusory just so far as we can show its harmony with that historical background. We can never, by the mere comparison of results, prove that one view of Jesus' person is truer than another. Indeed, we cannot by such means

prove the validity of any faith at all, but only its vitality. A historical argument is needed, not to prove that everything which faith asserts about Christ was literally true of Jesus—that it can never do, and, if it could, there would be no further need of faith—but to show that there is nothing accidental, or illusory, or improper in the identification of the divine Christ-ideal with the historical and wholly human figure of Jesus of Nazareth.”

This quotation will show, to those who are instructed in these matters, that Thompson’s position was essentially that of “Catholic Modernists” like George Tyrrell, Ernesto Buonaiuti, Friedrich von Hügel, and (for a time) Alfred Loisy; it bears no resemblance to the “Liberal Protestantism” of Harnack and his successors. That is to say, Thompson believed that it is through the growing experience of the Christian community of faith, with its religious judgment that the Man of Nazareth does for the believer what only God can do, that the belief in the Incarnation has its base; and that it is through participation in the life of that community, with its eucharistic worship above all (upon which he laid great stress), that this faith is developed in the believer, rather than through simple return to the supposedly historical figure alone. *Through facts, accepted as necessary, to faith*—this is the movement of the Church’s experience; *by sharing in that faith, accepted as enriching and nourishing, to the historical figure*—this is the way of the believer in the present time.

As to the problem of miracle, Thompson’s position is one that has by now become fairly general in many circles, although it is of course by no means commonly accepted. At this date, we can see that his protest was against a bastard definition of miracle commonly taken for granted in the Church; nowadays, we should wish to phrase the whole question very differently and should doubtless emerge with a quite different interpretation of the purpose of the gospel narratives, the place of the “mighty works” in the whole picture, and the biblical conception of these as “signs” rather than as evidential proof of divine action. But this is a large problem, for which the present paper has no space. Yet it ought to be said, for Thompson, that he was moving along the right lines—as even Canon H. E. W. Turner of Durham (the only theologian known to me to give Thompson’s views the attention they deserve; cf. *Jesus, Master and Lord*, 1953, pp. 156–58 and *passim*) seems, somewhat unwillingly, to recognize.

In an essay published during the controversy which his writings aroused, Thompson described his position as “Post-Modernism.” As

late as 1939, he returned to the theme, in a brief letter sent to *The Modern Churchman*. Here he urges that the real problem today "is no longer how to make Christianity acceptable to thinking people, but how to preserve religion at all in a world whose theology has been absorbed into feeling, experiencing, and living, and whose 'sense of sin' has been largely replaced by 'frustration.'" The issue is "whether the 'religious sense' is really innate in man, whether, if and when it appears, it is a valid assurance of the existence of God; and whether faith or philosophy can show that this God is One whom we can and must worship. A restatement of Christianity that would meet this need might be called Post-Modernism." He affirms that "so long as he [the Christian believer] finds in Christ the truest and highest human nature (and that means the completest immanence of the divine) he can call himself a Christian and a believer in God."

Cut off, by inhibition, from the exercise of his religious office, Thompson was somewhat like George Tyrrell who in similar case described himself as suffering from "altar hunger." He turned to the study of modern history, but he still felt keenly the absence of participation in religious life—or so I must judge, for in a letter from him dated May 11, 1953, he speaks of his envy for those who "can remain in the ministry." As late as December 9, 1955, he could write admiringly of H. J. Paton's just-published *The Modern Predicament* (the Gifford lectures in which Paton argued for religious faith as in no sense rendered impossible by science, criticism, and the like), and could describe the book as "good and uncommonly clear."

In his long poem, *The Spider's Web*, published in 1949 as "a philosophical essay in verse," Thompson describes man's quest for God, and movingly describes the way in which

The perfect manhood shares the God to be,
The perfect moment tastes eternity.

And he sees our whole history, and the story of the cosmos itself, as

A pilgrim's way, by which all creatures press,
A life whose origin and end are hid in God.

As I read the poem, which Thompson sent me with the note that "I am not satisfied with it, and should like to do it all over again. It is perhaps too much influenced by Samuel Alexander's philosophy. But you have been so generous to me that you will I know make the best

of it. I don't know whether at my age I shall have the opportunity or the wits to write any more on the subject. . . ."—as I read, my thought turned to something he had written over thirty-five years before:

"The supreme moment of our Lord's life, for myself, is Calvary; its one perfect symbol, the Crucifix. It is the moment and symbol of love perfected in suffering, of God and the world revealed as they truly are. . . . Is it this which moves men to penitence and a new life—the rejected love, and disappointed faith, and utter helplessness of him who gave himself up for the sins of the world? Or is it the story of some miracle?"

That, I think, states succinctly and with deep understanding the point of it all. And that, I think, sums up, too, the tragedy of Thompson's life, and why Major was not far wrong in calling him a "martyr."

SOME NOTES ON THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH

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I

Paul Tillich, since the publication of *Systematic Theology*, has become the most outstanding Protestant theologian in the country in so far as influence and prestige are concerned. The reputation is well earned for he has come to his task with unusual talent and academic qualifications. He has done a great deal to challenge the dominance in Protestantism of the Barthian spirit of intellectual anti-intellectuality and bring about a re-exploration of the meaning of philosophical theology.

All of this means that there is an obligation to examine his teaching most carefully and critically, though withal, admiringly. One facet of that teaching is examined here. It is a facet that Tillich himself regards as a primary and fundamental one. "A complete discussion of the relation of essence to existence is identical with the entire theological system. The distinction between essence and existence, which religiously speaking is the distinction between the created and the actual

world is the backbone of the whole body of theological thought."¹ This article, therefore, aims to examine, with care and humility, this important segment of Tillich's theology, the "distinction between essential and existential being"² which he tells us occurs "whenever the ideal is held against the real, truth against error, good against evil."³

The distinction between essence and existence is an ontological problem; that is, it is a problem in the study of the nature of being. However, in Tillich's case, especially, though he recognizes the primacy of ontology in philosophy,⁴ it is essential to say a word or two briefly about the general background of his theory of knowledge, his epistemology. Tillich's thought does not actually begin with "being," that is with existence in the sense of external objective existence. Rather it begins, like most philosophy since Descartes, with a theory of the relation of mind to external events. This theory is known as "phenomenology," and Tillich's particular brand of it is drawn from Husserl and Heidegger. Dangerously oversimplified, this means that all reality appears as phenomena in the mind.⁵ All being, then, is within the stream of consciousness. Some aspects of this world of appearance have a kind of "externality" stamped upon them while others are interior and subjective. "Being," therefore, for Tillich is a term never altogether used to designate an external, independent reality, an object out there, that would be "itself-without-me"; but there is always in his thinking a twilight universe of post-Kantian conceptualism as a kind of mental medium in which external being is discovered.⁶ Ontology, then, can never be the clear-cut approach to external being that it is in the thought of Aristotle, but being itself has a subjective "shape" which is molded by the mind in correspondence with external reality.

¹Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 204.

²Ibid., p. 202.

³Ibid.

⁴"It is 'first philosophy,' or, if the term could be used, 'metaphysics' . . . Thought is based on being." *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁵"Ontological reason can be defined as the structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and shape reality." *Ibid.*, p. 75. "Shaping in this context, has the connotation of transforming a given material into a Gestalt, a living structure which has the power of being." *Ibid.*, p. 76. "We transform reality according to the way we see it." *Ibid.*, p. 77. "The categories of experience are categories of finitude. They do not enable human reason to grasp reality-in-itself; but they do enable man to grasp his world, the totality of the phenomena which appear to him and which constitute his actual experience." *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁶"Self and environment determine each other." *Ibid.*, p. 170. "man never is completely bound to an environment. He always transforms it by grasping and shaping it according to universal norms." *Ibid.*

Tillich's mental universe is a kind of telephone exchange in which there are operators who handle interior, local calls and operators who handle long distance calls. Both kinds of "operators" are epistemologically subjective. Tillich's phrase, "the self-world structure", describes this union in consciousness of external facets having what Scholasticism called "intentionality" and subjective feelings, which Tillich calls "autonomous."

The importance of understanding this approach lies in the realization that Tillich is able to use the word "ontology" to describe a great many subjective states, such as "anxiety," as having ontological reference and meaning. His discussion of the distinction between essence and existence, which is our concern here, is very considerably modified by the fact that "ontological reality" is, in his thought, not so much "being-out-there" as being-which-appears-to-be-out-there. This makes possible, at the outset, a much closer approximation and relationship of the internal emotional nature of man and the external world of facts and events than is possible in a system of ontology that assumes that man's experience of the outer world is sufficiently exact so that a philosopher can construct an objective world of realities without the need to consult subjective states. Tillich's system denies the possibility of a purely objective ontology and is therefore able to introduce *Angst* as an ontological factor without having to inquire if cabbages also have *Angst*. By this means a great deal of anthropology and psychology are introduced into metaphysics. The distinction between essence and existence, therefore, is greatly influenced by the fact that the analysis is based upon the primary assumption of "the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being."

II

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

Tillich says that the distinction between essence, or the character, nature or structure of a thing, and existence, or the duration of that nature, occurs "Whenever the ideal is held against the real, truth against error, good against evil."⁷⁶ It is, of course, quite obvious that all circles have a certain structure which can be expressed as a mathematical formula and that this structure, regardless of the size of any

⁷⁶"The subject-object structure of being," "the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being." *Ibid.*

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 202.

circle, is applicable to all circles. It is equally obvious that any circle that the human hand can draw will never quite fulfil the formula of the circle. There will be some wavering, some lop-sidedness. The essence of the circle when it is projected in existence will be mathematically imperfect. So with wire-haired terriers. There is an "essence" of wire-haired terriers described in terms of measurements, ears, shape of legs, tail, quality of coat, and all that, in the standards of breeds of dogs, but no wire-haired terrier ever quite fulfills these to the limit of perfection. What a thing is and the fact it is are never quite in agreement with universal standards of perfection.

But is this what Tillich means? He uses the terms "truth against error, good against evil."¹⁰ Now a wire-haired terrier is not evil because he cannot conform to every ell of measurement in the code of standards. Nor is a circle "in error" if it is sufficiently circular, like an automobile wheel, to function "in the round." Clearly failure to fully express the universal structure of its type and kind is not what Tillich is concerned with. Accidental variations that do not pervert structure are not "evil." And, also, by accident some circle might, at some time, be perfect, and then what happens to the Tillichian distinctions of evil and error, as deep ontological facts?

There is obviously a deeper doctrine here than mere accidental variation of particular manifestations from the structural norm of types. Existence is not merely a pale reflection of essence, but Tillich says "a distortion of essential being is presupposed"¹¹ in existence. He admits that there is ambiguity in the use of the term "essence." "Essence can be the nature of a thing without any valuation of it; it can mean the universals which characterize a thing; it can be the ideas in which it participates."¹² Accepting these metaphysical and logical meanings, however, he adds his own interpretation, viz. "it can mean the norm by which a thing must be judged; it can mean the original goodness of everything created; and it can be the pattern of all things in the divine mind."¹³ "Essence," he adds, "as the nature of a thing . . . has one character. Essence as that from which being has 'fallen,' the true and undistorted nature of things, has another character."¹⁴ "The an-

¹⁰This is not an isolated statement but habitual. *The Courage To Be*. (New Haven: Yale, 1952) pp. 126 f., and "Propositions" (privately mimeographed lecture outlines), I, 7.

¹¹*Systematic Theology*, I, 202.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 203.

swer lies in the ambiguous character of existence, which expresses being and at the same time contradicts it. . . . Essence gives existence its 'power of being' and at the same time stands against it as commanding law."¹⁴ "Existence can mean the actuality of what is potential in the realm of essence, or it can mean the 'fallen world'." "Whatever exists, that is stands out of the realm of potentiality, is more than it is in the state of mere potentiality, and less than it could be in the power of its essential nature."¹⁵

These various quotations begin to characterize the Tillichian distinction between the nature of a thing and its ontological duration. He dissects the history of the distinction in Christian thought, comparing Plato's ethical and axiological concept of form or essence with Ockam's definition as a "mere reflex of existence."¹⁶ Aristotle, he says, took "a mediating attitude" between these extremes because for him "the actual is the real."¹⁷ Christianity, he asserts, has been closer to Aristotle than to Plato and Ockam because Christianity has thought of existence as "the fulfillment of Creation."¹⁸ Still he insists that in spite of this Aristotelian leaning, "Christianity has emphasized the split between the created goodness of things and their distorted existence." He goes on to define essence as "the essential goodness of reality,"¹⁹ and says "the distinction between essence and existence is the distinction between the created and the actual world."²⁰

Obviously, in Tillich's thinking the actual, existent world of earthly, created things is a fallen and distorted world. Existence is a rude fall into cosmic materiality and actuality from the realm of essence.²¹ He contrasts a "good, real, true" order of reality and a distorted actuality. This is clarified by the phrase, "tensions and disruptions characteristic of the transition from essence to existence."²²

In writing philosophically Tillich puts the word "fall" between quotation marks. This, in all probability, is to indicate that he is making

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 204.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹The *Courage To Be*, p. 127. Speaking of essences St. Thomas said, "Plato held them to be *per se* subsistent and to be the immediate cause of the forms of sensible bodies, whereas we hold them to exist in an intellect. *Summa* (Random House ed.), II, 41.

²²Systematic Theology I, p. 205.

use of symbolic language.²³ With or without quotation marks he has characterized the created order as distorted, evil, erroneous and disrupted. Perhaps it would be clearer to say that he has denied that the mundane, existing world is the Creation. The Creation seems, for him, to be the essences that have their root and origin in the "divine ground." He says, "Originating creation is the generation of Essential potentialities in the divine life."²⁴ "It is my assertion that the fulfilment of creation and the beginning of the Fall, are, though logically different, ontologically the same."²⁵ This means, obviously, that the moment created essences were fulfilled in existence that very extension of the essential into a universe of dust and time and space was a Fall.

Here we have left the narthex of metaphysical philosophy and have entered the nave of theology. Here, clearly, is a doctrine of a cosmic fall. Yet Christian theology, in its central tradition, does not mean by "fall" the kind of inevitable cosmic debacle that Tillich has made the word mean. It is not so much that by "fall" Christianity means the fall of man, for Tillich has two falls, the cosmic one based on ontology and an anthropological one. The human or anthropological fall in Tillich is based upon voluntarism, on the choice of evil.²⁶ The connection between the cosmic fall and the anthropological fall is that the universal fall of existence creates the "possibility," the ground of decision, for the human fall.²⁷

Tillich has said, as we have quoted above, that Christianity has emphasized the split between the created goodness of things and their distorted existence.²⁸ However, in classical Christianity it is difficult to find a doctrine similar to this teaching that the very act of existence creates a state of fallenness from creation. There are faint references to a cosmic, or demonic fall, especially in the Epistle of St. Jude. Previously, in the writings ascribed to Baruch a demonic distortion of angelic life is predicated. However, in Christian and Jewish tradition, the cosmic fall, or better still, the angelic fall, is always, like the human fall, voluntaristic, a matter of a decision that Satan and his angels have

²³"The truth of a religious symbol has nothing to do with the truth of the empirical assertions involved in it." *Ibid.*, p. 240. "This is said symbolically" occurs on 255, where the divine knowledge of the Fall is discussed.

²⁴"Propositions," II, 31.

²⁵*The Theology of Paul Tillich*, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 342, f.

²⁶*Systematic Theology*, I, pp. 255 f.

²⁷*The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 222.

²⁸*Systematic Theology*, I, p. 204.

made. Just as the redactor of the Book of Genesis deserted his sources in Babylonian theology to make man's sinfulness a matter of choice, rather than, as in the earlier Babylonian-Sumerian account, a result of being made of the "clay of the Apsu" mingled with the evil dragon blood of Kingu,²⁹ so "cosmic fall" has seldom been in Christian tradition a result of being-in-existence. Some traces of that teaching appeared in the Pseudo-Dionysius and in Origen, and were also reflected in Scotus Erigena. Recently, however, the work done upon the Dead Sea Scrolls has emphasized the distinction between the "expectant" groups who produced the Scrolls, and early Christianity, especially the Christianity of the Gospels, in the use and dominance of a dualistic doctrine of a world dominated by evil powers. There is, considering the environment of dualistic forms of non-normative Judaism, very little dualistic reference in the Gospels to the Prince of this World. Christianity is closer to the normal Hebrew doctrine that God made the world and found it good.

The cursing of the earth in Genesis is for man's sake and follows the fall of Adam. The earth did not tumble out of essence into evil existence. This, indeed, is a major theme in Christianity's fight with Gnosticism and later Manicheanism. Irenaeus attacked the idea that the good creation is the Gnostic Pleroma and that the earth was born of an abortive fall from the Pleroma.³⁰ Pleroma, for Irenaeus, is the unfolding of the creative, divine Will in "the fulness of time." That fallenness is a constituent characteristic of finite being has certainly never been a Christian doctrine save in discarded and sometimes anathematized speculations.³¹

It is difficult to know just how literally Tillich takes his own doctrine of a cosmic fall that occurs when the good creation of an essential order falls down into existence. In the first place he recognizes the influence upon his thought of Schelling's theory of the subjective truth revealed by mythology,³² and he has been greatly influenced by

²⁹The Orphic analogue of this is the making of man from the ashes of the Titans.

³⁰Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*. Bk. I, Ch. 10, 11; Book IV, Chp. 14, 37, 38. Irenaeus says that the Gnostics attacked the sacraments on the ground that "the mystery of the ineffable and invisible should not be performed by means of visible and corruptible things," Bk. I, Ch. 21.

³¹St. Thomas seems to sum up the central Christian position on the goodness of existence. "In every creature to be and to be good are not the same absolutely, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists." *Contra Gentiles* (Random ed.), II, 33.

³²*The Theology of Paul Tillich*, autobiographical introduction, p. 4.

the "projection" theories of the Freudian theory of religion.²³ Also, his own epistemology, that of Heidegger and Husserl, hardly builds watertight bulkheads between subjective reactions to the nature of the world and a philosophical, detached effort to understand the nature of the world.²⁴ One suspects that Being has been seen through spectacles ground on the emery wheel of *Angst*, but the discussion of that must come later.

Tillich expresses surprise that a conclusion that the finite world is fallen can be drawn from his writings.²⁵ In defence, he says, "First of all, it is my assertion that the fulfilment of creation and the beginning of the Fall, are, though logically different, ontologically the same. . . . The Fall is the work of finite freedom, but it happened universally in everything finite."²⁶ I cannot see that this alters the situation in any way, save in so far that the word "freedom" has been introduced, a word which applies to the human fall but could hardly have much reference to the existential "fall" of atoms and molecules.

Lest we have become thoroughly confused by Tillich's use of symbol, of mythological constructs, and his tendency to create a synthesis of the subjective and objective facets of human thought, suppose we check our interpretation by the words of other and more qualified commentators. Niebuhr characterizes Tillich's doctrine by saying, "The myth of the transcendental Fall describes the translation (from essence to existence) as a universal event in ontological terms."²⁷ He further says, "Evil is involved in finiteness as such."²⁸ "When he speaks of existence standing in contradiction to essence, 'essence' means that from which existence has fallen." It has fallen because it is no longer inside "the divine ground."²⁹ Niebuhr concludes, "We end with the difficult conclusion that temporal existence is really evil."³⁰

²³Tillich accepts the "projection" theory that gods, etc. "are images of human nature," but says the screen on which these projections are thrown is "the realm of ultimate concern," clearly another psychic element (*Systematic Theology*, p. 212). Perhaps "Fall" is also a psychological projection upon a screen of anxiety and concern, and, therefore, a subjective rather than cosmic event.

²⁴Pp. 2-4, *supra*.

²⁵"The reproach that I identify finitude and evil. This surprises me." *Theology of Paul Tillich*, pp. 342 f.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 220.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 221. "Divine ground" recalls Anaximander's boundless and the injustice owed by each element when it became a partial and finite substance.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 225.

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The late Professor David Roberts comes to much the same conclusion as Niebuhr. He writes, "Many readers will be baffled by the idea that the actualization of finite freedom is, from one point of view, the *telos* of creation, and, from another point of view, the ruination of creation." Roberts concludes, "it is finitude that makes sin possible."⁴¹

The distinction that Tillich has made between essence and existence appears again in Professor A. T. Mollegen's treatment of Tillich's Christology. Mollegen's understanding of it is that, according to Tillich, "The beginning of the Fall and the end of Creation are simultaneous,"⁴² "Essential being is what should be; the world as the divine creation. Existential being is the fallen world, deriving from, yet contradicting its essential being because it is the actualization of essential being."⁴³ Applied to Christology this produces a most curious twist, viz., "The Cross exposes the full enmity of existence to essential being."⁴⁴ This statement clearly bestows a demiurgical character upon the universe of nature and a docetic quality upon Christ. "The New Being," the Christ, appears "transcending existential being because it [sic] is the actualization of essential being."⁴⁵

The conclusion seems to be that for Tillich finite creation either is evil or is universally involved in evil. His strongest statement of this is in an earlier work, *The Interpretation of History*, where he says, "Unity in the depth of essential nature is the divine; their separation in existence, the relatively independent eruption of the abyss in things, is the demonic."⁴⁶ Finitude seems to capable of being broken down into three factors: first, the nature, or universal, or form, or essence, which he recognizes as both a structural and logical aspect; secondly, potentiality, or material content, which seems morally neutral; and, thirdly, non-being, or the factor of perishability, which seems to be the source of evil.⁴⁷ A finite object participates in the "good creation"

⁴¹ *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 126.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 239.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* I have been unable to locate in Tillich's writings the statement that the Cross demonstrates the enmity of existence against essence. No doubt this could be drawn by implication, but it seems to carry Tillich closer to a purely gnostic conclusion than the tone of his work warrants. However Tillich says that Professor Mollegen represents his point of view. *Ibid.*, p. 348. Tillich does use the phrase, "self-destructive consequences of Essential separation." "Propositions," III, 19.

⁴⁵ *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 240.

⁴⁶ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 84.

⁴⁷ "The threat of non-being which is implied in existence." *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 64.

from the point of view of its essential nature. The demonic is present by means of the finite creature's "participation" in non-being.⁴⁸ To exist is to be characterized by separation, estrangement, disruption and separation from the divine ground, which is a realm of essence.

Tillich's doctrine of a cosmic fall, based, ontologically, on the distinction of essence and existence, is perhaps best stated in his own words.

Every theologian who is courageous enough to face the twofold truth that nothing can happen to God accidentally and that the state of existence is a fallen state must accept the point of coincidence between the end of creation and the beginning of the fall. . . . The supralapsarian Calvinists, who asserted that Adam fell by divine decree, had the courage to face this situation. . . . Creation is fulfilled in the creaturely self-realization which simultaneously is freedom and destiny. But it is fulfilled through separation from the creative ground through a break between existence and essence.⁴⁹

III

SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE DOCTRINE

The first difficulty that presents itself in Tillich's doctrine of the "split" between essence and existence is the solution of the problem of how essence can be the structure and ground of every existence in the universe⁵⁰ while at the same time existence is described as estrangement, separation and disruption from essences.⁵¹ Tillich's universe is an essential universe in the sense that essences possess the "power of being," and, on the other hand, it is an existential universe in which existence is separated from its essences. If essence is the structure and pattern of things, and, clearly, Tillich claims that it is, it is hard to see how things can exist without this structure. It is

⁴⁸Tillich defines non-being as a dialectical reality. "There can be no world unless there is a dialectical participation of non-being in being". *Ibid.*, p. 187. Heidegger's "annihilating nothingness" describes man's situation of being threatened by non-being," p. 189. "The dialectical problem of non-being is inescapable. It is the problem of finitude," p. 189. "Everything which participates in the power of being is 'mixed' with non-being," p. 189. "The eruption of the abyss in things is the demonic." *The Interpretation of History*, p. 84. "Fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness," *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 255.

⁴⁹*Systematic Theology*, I p. 256. The same statement also appears in *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 343.

⁵⁰"Only those things can live which embody a rational structure," *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁵¹"In actualized freedom, in an existence which is no longer united with essence," *Ibid.*, p. 255.

something like asking a coat to stand up without a man in it. Tillich, however, is a competent philosopher and very possibly here his hurry to pass from ontology to theology creates this difficulty. For the reader, however, it remains an obstacle. If the essence of a squirrel is the pattern and structure and organization that makes up this particular form of rodent it is difficult to see how it could get about without its essence. That would, indeed, be estrangement. Essence cannot be both "the power of life" and a separated "good Creation." This is perhaps something along the order of the "third man" difficulty that grew up in regard to Platonic forms, for it seems to demand two essences, one in the good creation and the other existentially mixed with potentiality and non-being. In that case one could speak of the "ur-essences" from which things have split and the forms or essences of things themselves. This is a problem, perhaps, which any form of idealism or essentialism meets, and perhaps the only solution, though this is not the place to develop it, is that the distinction between essence and existence is a rational distinction within the discipline of ontology not a real distinction within the structure of nature itself. Everything must exist as what it is. Essences cannot go off and leave existences to go about their business, for existences then have no "business," no vocation of how to exist or what manner "to be."

The second difficulty is along the same line though perhaps not so formally entangled with traditional metaphysical concepts. Indeed, the question may very well be crude and naïve. It is, however, a question that recurs as one reads Tillich. The question is, What difference does it make to a thing, an ontological entity or event, like a telephone pole, to be involved in a cosmic fall? What is the difference, in other words, between the ur-essence of pole and the actual existent pole? Pole is a man-made artifact and is mutilated by man's imperfect labor, but suppose we take the simplest entity or event, or at least the simplest known organized thing, an atom of hydrogen. This entity consists, apparently, of one proton and one electron, arranged in a pattern of tension. According to Tillich's doctrine of ontological fall it is estranged, separated, and split off from its essence or "ur-essence." What is the difference between the ur-essence of an atom of hydrogen and an existential atom of hydrogen existing, say in the sun? One is within the "creative ground" and the other is in the sun. One exists and the other has only "essential existence" or mental existence. Perhaps this is a silly question because, obviously, by propounding a doctrine of the Fall Tillich meant to be theological, and the "Fall" of

an atom of hydrogen into existence has very little relation to the great sweep of mythological cosmology that draws its incentives from the wars of the Titans and the Angels. Still a philosopher must share with God the tragedy of the fall of sparrows and atoms. Clearly, if Tillich's doctrine of a cosmic fall be a description of the universe, an hydrogen atom is worthy of compassion for its existential predicament is that it is estranged, separated, finite and mingled with non-being.

The difference between an atom of hydrogen in the sun and the "ur-essence" of hydrogen in the realm of essence (or the creative ground) is that an atom of hydrogen is perishable. As Tillich says it is mingled with non-being in the sense that it is a creature which becomes, endures and perishes. There is every possibility that it will become helium or step down its existence into the flow of rays and currents of energy. Perishability is the hallmark of existence.

There is a classical term for this, and it is significant that Tillich makes very little use of it.⁵² The term is "contingency," and in classical Christian theism it has meant that a contingent creature was created by God and is doomed in time to perish. Contingency does not mean being separated from the divine ground. Essentially it means dependence upon the will of God. It would be very difficult to substitute for this term such terms as non-being, separation, estrangement, or Fall. Contingency involves none of those dramatic possibilities but refers to the fact that all finite things owe their existence to God and have no inherent right to exist of themselves. An atom of hydrogen has contingency in this sense.

It is interesting also that contingency has always been an argument for Creation, never, as far as I know, an argument for a cosmic Fall. As Mascall has pointed out, the five Thomist ways of demonstrating the existence of God are but five illustrations of the contingency of finite creatures and their dependence upon an infinite existent.⁵³ The famous passage of St. Augustine in which he asks the creatures for an account of their source is a poetic illustration of the uses of contingency. "And what is this, I asked the earth; and it answered 'I am not He.' And whatsoever are therein made the same confession. I asked the sea and the deeps and the creeping things that lived, and they replied, 'We are not thy God; seek higher than we!'"⁵⁴

⁵²There are but four references in the index of *Systematic Theology*.

⁵³E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), p. 67.

⁵⁴St. Augustine, *Confessions*, (Random House ed.) I, 151.

In short, classical Christian theology, faced with the problem of the perishability of the creatures, with the fact that "All flesh is grass," uses this universal fact as an argument for the necessity of a creative Will to make the creatures and to undergird the perishability of things. However, for Tillich, despite his theistic tendency, perishability and contingency are not so much arguments for the existence of God as an opportunity to introduce a very stimulating but somewhat bewildering doctrine of Cosmic Fall.

It seems to me that this doctrine creates unnecessary problems and solves few of the problems that already existed. Yet perhaps for Tillich it is inevitable because his epistemology prevents him from taking a realistic and objective approach to ontology. Despite his constant attempt to pass beyond the boundaries of existential phenomenology, the burden of subjectivism makes an emergence from the human existential predicament difficult to achieve. In Tillich's system of polarities *Angst*, as an ontological feature, asserts itself as the human awareness of finitude, and this awareness, as a phenomenon of consciousness which Tillich feels has been demonstrated by depth psychology,⁶⁶ colors his ontological approach. Fear of death and extinction, of meaninglessness, and aspects of guilt, enter into man's evaluation of his cosmic predicament, and thus *Angst* dictates a mood of estrangement and separation which can be mythologized as a universal Fall, and ontologized as the "split" between essence and existence. "The ontological structure of being," Tillich says, "shows itself to man in the structure of his own being."⁶⁷ Within the psychic structure of man Tillich finds the Threat of Non-being which arises in consciousness as *Angst* and this fact becomes, I suspect, the touchstone of his approach to the cosmos, which, in turn, he finds darkened with separation and estrangement from the "divine ground." "Finitude in awareness is anxiety"⁶⁸ is a deep clue to the tendency of Tillich's thought.⁶⁹

Acceptance of Tillich's doctrine, whether literal or symbolic, of a cosmic fall in nature depends upon whether the general approach of

⁶⁶"The recovery of the meaning of anxiety through the combined endeavors of existential philosophy, depth psychology, neurology and the arts is one of the achievements of the twentieth century." *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 191. "Anxiety is ontological." *Ibid.*

⁶⁷"Propositions," Part II, p. 2.

⁶⁸*Systematic Theology*, I, p. 191.

⁶⁹Tillich's thought is architectonic and all this is connected with his epistemology. Common phrases in his work such as "the depth of reason" and "ultimate concern" reveal that the subjective is allowed, by his system, to invade the detachment and objectivity of ontological thought.

subjective existentialism, as a Creed, is acceptable, and whether or not *Angst* is acceptable as a constituent of human nature.⁵⁹ This is not the place to debate general issues of this kind, though, certainly, one has a right to say that both of these positions are debatable.

In conclusion I feel that Tillich's ontology is unsatisfactory and that it raises more problems than it exorcises. Beyond that I also feel, very strongly, that his general assertion of "the radical and universal nature of evil"⁶⁰ raises grave problems in theology, that it compromises the Christian doctrine of Creation, "docetizes" the Incarnation,⁶¹ and makes Grace contrary to Nature rather than its fulfillment in sacramental theology. In other words Tillich, by his emphasis upon a split between essence and existence, has revoked themes and issues which were debated with the Gnostics and which Catholic Christianity has steadily rejected.

There is great wealth and richness of insight in Tillich's thought so that in isolating one strand of it for examination one feels that one is reducing a block of steel to a thin and brittle wire. His contribution lies much more in the total effect and tone of his writing than in any one element. Even in expressing dissatisfaction and lack of assent with certain facets, one admires and rejoices in the whole architectonic edifice. Because of him we have come a long way from the paralysis of Barthian anti-intellectuality. Nevertheless it is necessary to keep balance and, obviously, a view of creation that regards its whole structure as a Fallen Universe is an idiosyncrasy within the Christian tradition which, over against various pessimistic heresies, proclaims that when God made his world he found it good. In the scriptural tradition the work of the seven days did not end in a cosmic fall in which evil was a fated necessity but in an atmosphere of freedom in which rebellion could occur quite naturally without benefit of a supralapsarian decree. Existentialism, after all, is a frustrated and thwarted form of Humanism in which man, according to the Kirkegaardian analysis, finds himself in a pit of "fear and trembling, and sickness unto death." Over against this "demiurgic" view of the world, stands classic Christianity

⁵⁹ Allport says of *Angst*, "Anxiety, though obviously not a universal trait among normal people, is a common condition among neurotics and may be said to be the *raison d'être* for the whole theory of psychoanalysis." Gordon W. Allport, *Personality*, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937), p. 182.

⁶⁰ *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 343.

⁶¹ "The appearance of the New Being above essence and existence," *Ibid.*, p. 244. "His appearance as man with an analogous logos, an actualized essential manhood," p. 243. "A divine Logos appears in the shape of physical man, or man in the flesh," p. 238. "He is the New Being transcending existential being," p. 240.

which finds its support in the doctrines of Creation, of Incarnation, and the Sacraments, which assert, by implication, that there is no existential split between essence and existence, for Grace is the fulfillment of Nature, not its enemy, and the bread of mundane life which is offered upon the altar is capable of becoming holy because it is, at root, a gift of God. With Tillich there is a split between the essential and the existent, between a world of ethereal Thou and a world of It. Christianity knows no such fissure in Creation.

AN ESSAY ON NATURAL LAW

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When Lord Acton observed that "few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of ideas" he might have omitted the qualification had he been thinking of the idea of Natural Law. Both the concept and the term Natural Law share with the word Nature the dubious fame of being a knave of many faces.

The source of what is essential to the concept of Natural Law (its immutability and its inherent sanctions) appears to have been discovered not in Nature but in custom, and it was originally impressed upon the human mind not by science or philosophy but by convention. Natural Law theory is today vigorously supported by those directly committed to tradition in religion and bitterly opposed to, the "individualism" of the modern world, yet its development was in its earliest stages a revolt against traditional religion and the instrument of the individualistic protest against political tradition. Natural Law has been the court of appeal throughout the course of Western Thought as it was in the beginning in Greece for the widest possible range of political, social, economic, and religious viewpoints. Antiphon, Thrasymachus, Adimantus then, and Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in modern times, sought their ethical norms in Natural Law no less than did Plato, Cicero, Epictetus, and Thomas Aquinas.

For the purpose of an historical classification of Natural Law theory which could serve to expose its pedigree and delineate its significant

species I suggest the following typology: (1) Nature as Moira conceived as (a) Might, (b) Reason, (c) Passion; (2) Nature as History.

I. NATURAL LAW AS MOIRA

The notion of Moira as fixed and unalterable order, which I take to be the parent of all Natural Law theory, had its source in the force of custom in folk society. Tribal custom is indeed the pre-philosophic equivalent of Nature.¹ This is the deeper level of insight in Pindar's dictum that law is king.² Without formal contract, without agreement, the strongly patterned rights and obligations of the individual are unquestionably accepted as deriving from necessity, from the nature of things. The pattern is sacred, beyond criticism, even beyond question. In the ancestral way *physis* and *nomos* are as yet undifferentiated, yet the germ of the concept of nature as "the way of things" has here its genesis. Burnet concludes that such is the line of development traceable in Greece.

In the early days the regularity of human life had been far more clearly apprehended than the even course of nature. Man lived in a charmed circle of law and custom but the world around him still seemed lawless. When the regular course of nature began to be observed, no better name could be found for it than Right or Justicee (dike), a word which probably meant the unchangng custom that guided human life.

Moira was at first the maker of custom—the weaver of the personal lot of man. Its etymology preserves the clue: the verb *meiromai*, "to receive one's portion," and was originally, according to Cornford, the "special divisions or portions of primitive tribes."³ Similarly, Nomos as the articulated or codified rule of custom was first associated with allotment: *nomē* is "pasture;" and Aisa the "fated decree" is the appropriate share. Themis, who is older than Dike and came to be the guardian of law by consent⁴ was in earliest usage concerned with dooms and with personal lot.⁵

¹Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 83.

²Frag. 181, quoted by Herodotus iii, 38.

³Cf. Jaeger, *Paideia*, p. 321. The old Moira lives on in the modern Greek Mira. See G. van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, II, 4.

⁴Cf. G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, App. D, p. 337. Cf. Greene, *Moira*, p. 402.

⁵Cf. Iliad xi. 807.

"In the "Hymn of the Kouretes" by ordeal young men leap for full jars and fields and "goodly Themis." See J. Harrison, *Themis*, pp. 8; 515-19. In Aeschylus *Themis*

A new stage is reached in the development of the concept of Natural Law when the folk society creates in mythology the insight that Nature, too, has her customs and that these are also of necessity. Moira and *anankē*, "strong necessity" and *heimarmenē*, "the fated allotment" are the necessary order of that way which is nature.

This impersonal power above the gods—the power of the custom or the way of nature—is found also in other cultures. In the Vedas the Rita of the gods (the divine law for man) looms up to hide that Rita which is the Cosmic Law—the world course that stands eternally constant "where the sun's chargers are unharnessed."⁷ Tao was in ancient China the custom of nature, "the path which the universe follows." "When great Tao was deserted justice came into existence;" i.e. law emerged.

In Greece as in India the custom of nature was a harsh order. Apportioners of nature's way to man were the "daughters of night."⁸ Heimarmene forms the evil circle of generation within which man, so far as he is a creature of physics, must remain. Late Hellenistic and medieval natural law theory, while emphasizing the eternal and unalterable aspect of nature, ignored this other aspect, the darkness of its working, which is found in Plato and Aristotle and the Stoicks as well as the earlier poets. Frequently ignored is the Politicus myth in Plato where the elements of irrationality and blindness in nature are depicted. These are explained by the story of the Divine Helmsman who momentarily released control of the helm to Fate (heimarmene) and blind necessity (ananke) and matter. This is a myth of a fall before man, of the wounding of nature before the advent of human life. Here, then God's will is opposed to the works and the workings of physis. Ananke is set over against Nous. "Now our discourse must also set by the side of the creations of Reason the effects of Necessity (ananke). For the generation of this world of ours came about from a combination of Necessity and Reason. . . . This universe was then compacted

is another name of Gaea (V. 211f). The myth of Moira clearly fixes the primitive notion as the "necessity" of tribal custom. She is the mistress of the weavers, the Moirae, who weave into the swaddling bands of the yet unborn infant the mark of his clan and the share to be accorded him. See R. Graves, *The Greek Myths*, I, 10 c; 60. 2.

⁷Finally the Rita of the gods and the soul of man (Atman) are seen as the veil or the delusion which is nature, to obscure the ultimate reality. Atman and Brahman are one: *tat tvam asi*.

⁸Hesiod *Theog.* 218, 904. The darkness of Fate's decree is the burden of the Gnostic poets. "Neither prosperity nor stubborn war nor all destroying strife cometh to us of our choice but Aisa who giveth all things brings now the cloud upon one hand and now upon the other" *Bacchylides*, frag. 20.

in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over necessity."⁹ But that victory was not unconditional and hence there can be no complete science, no complete philosophy, and particularly no complete philosophy of history.¹⁰ A similar qualification of the rationality of nature is added by Aristotle, *to kata symbebēkos*, "that which happens neither always nor for the most part, but which nevertheless does occur."¹¹

To accept nature's inexorable and dark workings is Dike. It is the counsel of piety as Sophocles confesses: "Chain of things that be . . . to thee I lift my praise, seeing the silent road that bringeth justice ere the end be trod to all that breathes and dies."¹² There is a dark working within, the blight of Ate driving on to Hubris and Atasthalia and the inexorable working without which conjoined lead to Nemesis. Such is the pattern of Greek tragedy. Its structure as disclosed in Aristotle's *Poetics* is not something artificial or devised, it is not imposed upon life, but is found in life. It is the poetry of truth. In the character of the inevitable is found the concept of unalterable physical orded. "All things are by necessity."¹³

Physis as Moira, then, is the origin of the concept of Cosmos, a word that first appears in the fragments of the philosopher of numbers, Pythagoras. It is the order of the nature of mathematical necessity, fixed and unalterable.¹⁴ Moira seems first to have become natural law in Anaximander's dictum: "But whatever things are the genesis of the things that are, into these they must pass away according to necessity; for they must pay the penalty and make atonement to one another for their injustice according to time's decree."¹⁵ The very terms of custom, of nomos, supply the description of physis, and it is in part in

⁹ *Politicus* 268 e-274.

¹⁰ Cf. *Timaeus* 47 e-48a. Cf. Greene, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 ff.

¹¹ Greene, *op. cit.* p. 321.

¹² *Trojan Women*, 884ff.

¹³ Aetius 1.27; Cf. Theognis 373-392; Simonides *frag.* 4 (D); Euripides, *Alcestis* 378; 416, 617. The answer is endurance. All may be lost save honor and tlemosyne. If you have this you have fulfilled your nature. This is the measure of the good man, the goodness of Oedipus. Jocasta who would "live at random" fails of the prize. Oedipus fulfills his destiny. It is the goodness too of Socrates in the *Apology*, and the righteous counsel of Edgar in *King Lear* (v. 2) "Men must endure their going hence even as their coming hither. Ripeness is all." To live at random is to invite worse woe. It is to wither before fruition. Cf. Bacchylides xvi. 24-26.

¹⁴ Aetius *ap.* Plutarch, *de Placit. phil.* 2.1.1. Cf. E. Hatch, *Greek Ideas and Usages*, p. 209.

¹⁵ Simplicius, *Physics* xxiv 13f. Cf. Heraclitus: "These live the death of those while those die the death of these," *frag.* 62.

appeal to the older custom against the new nomoi of the polis the Anaximander and Heraclitus speak. The authority of custom has become the authority of the all-inclusive Politeia—the cosmos. In the name of Physis the nomoi of the cities can now be challenged. Physis is set over against convention and in the name of physis the law is challenged and religion is brought to trial. The first philosophers are distinguished from the poets in Aristotle as those who discourse on nature. Their predecessors were those "who discoursed on gods."¹⁶

Two problems are now created by the emergence of natural law theory. The first of these is the problem poignantly dramatized in the tragedies of Aeschylus (*Prometheus*) and Sophocles (*Antigone*): the real and essential conflict of interest between the unwritten laws informing the individual conscience and the sanctions of positive law without which the polis cannot survive.¹⁷ The two do not always, perhaps cannot, serve the same end. Plato in several passages seldom treated sees the conflict of nature and man in the individual as well. Men's souls, created out of the same stuff as the soul of the universe, are informed by the Creator with the "laws of their destiny," *nomos tous heimarmenos*.¹⁸ But they are of necessity enclosed in bodies and therefore subject to the distortion of sensible perception and to the passions. To be sure, it is possible that the souls shall master the bodies. To this all are "called" but few will be "chosen."

The second problem is the occasion for the pleading of the wicked counsel in the conflict of the natural and the positive law. It is the sophistic turning of the saying of Heraclitus: "In God's view all things are fair and good and just, but men have made the supposition that some things are just and others unjust."¹⁹ Antiphon is its spokesman. The city, he argues, is by its constitution conventional, a creation of men which includes some and excludes others. It is thus a convention in conflict of interest, perhaps to the extent of survival, with other similar conventions, and exists only in the pretense that it serves the good of all.²⁰ What is truly according to nature is the desire of pleasure.

It is but a step from this unrighteous counsel to the notion of moira as might in the Politeia as in the Cosmos. This is a serious and persuasive theory of natural law both in argument and in history. To

¹⁶ *Metaphysics* 981b 27; 982b 18. Cf. Strauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 85.

¹⁷ Cf. *Antigone* 450-460.

¹⁸ *Timaeus* 41 c 2-3.

¹⁹ *Frag.* 102.

²⁰ *Protagoras* 337 c 7-d3; *Republic* 456b 12-c3.

Callicles, who is its spokesman in the *Gorgias*, Plato accords serious and respectful attention. Nomos is the instrument of the many who are weak in their conspiracy to fetter the strong. The exercise of strength as a gift of nature is in accord with nature.²¹

The crucial question of the natural law theory of Plato (nature as reason) involves its practical relevance to the earthly Politeia. If the Socratic Plato goes no farther than Socrates, one may fairly ask if we have then to do with any proper natural law theory at all, that is in the sense of articulated norms possessing absolute validity in accordance with reason. If, however, we hear the Pythagorean Plato expound the eternal laws of the heavenly Politeia against the background of the philosopher's own serious doubt that men could live in accord with that nature, we may fairly ask in what sense the natural law of the realm of ideas is a natural law in the sensible world. We must answer that it is not irrelevant to this world, but that, for the most part, it is not relevantly practical. It is a law for contemplation, not for action. Even as adapted to this world, and into that compromise distortion enters, it is the constitution of Utopia—of nowhere. Plato's Utopia is suspended, as it were, tantalizingly close to earth, close enough to be glimpsed by the philosopher. But it does not touch the earth; both its poles of support are above. It hangs between the myth of the cave with which the *Republic* begins and the myth of the soul with which the *Republic* ends. The Nomos of the earthly Politeia, even on the level of the theoretically best regime (*The Laws*) is not an application of the Natural Law of the Intelligible World. It is a denial in despair, though not a disloyal denial. The persuasion of reason without force is dethroned by the appeal to force without reason in the interest of the only end which the earthly Politeia can serve and in recognition of the risk, too great to be taken, of freedom. Justice, then, is the means to the fulfillment of the philosopher-king, of the

²¹*Gorgias* 480 ff. The serious point in the argument of Thrasymachus relates nomos to physics. *Republic* i, 349 b ff. Where he is made to overstate his case, or rather to turn a strong argument into a straw man is in the assertion that pleonexia is the law of nature. Cf. *Republic* 343 c3, 6, 7; d2; 348 c11-d12; 360 d5; *Protogoras* 333 d4-e1. In modern times natural law as might receive its classic formulation in Machiavelli and Hobbes. The new note is the emphasis upon the empirical study of human nature, i.e. a realistic approach to anthropology in search of the strongest motivation. This Hobbes found in the fear of death with which he replaces the classical notion of telos. His positive statement of natural law becomes the norm of self-preservation. Man enters into society to secure his individual rights against a rapacious individualism. Government and natural law are hence to be understood as primarily concerned not with human duty but with human rights. The state exists to protect rights. This is the genesis of modern political liberalism. Cf. Strauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 181 f.

few that can be saved. Even they must in education be led by dogmatism. Philosophy is now goal. It cannot be as well the means.

In Aristotle Ethics as a discipline begins with the study of the moral nature of man. The chief part of ethics is political virtue defined as justice which is instituted and supported by law. The categories of natural law and conventional law are retained by Aristotle and so related to each other that justice may be said to lie between them. Natural law does not, however, exist apart from positive law in the sense that it transcends political society. Such a transcendent law, Aristotle insists, could not be law natural to men. The only thing that he says about natural law is that all natural right is changeable. It is always and everywhere relative to the concrete situation. What may be natural right in situation A cannot be generalized to be that which is right even for the class Z to which the situation A belongs. We are justified in concluding that Aristotle's unqualified assertion that there are no universal norms in natural law explains the fact that he does not attempt to formulate them. All that his theory of natural law can, therefore, be said to mean is that in every situation there is a naturally right choice to be made or judgment to be given and that such a judgment will be natural because it will be in accord with reason.

Only in Stoicism in the classical world can we find a natural law theory as that phrase is generally understood. It alone stood in the direct line of inheritance from the Gnomic poets, the dramatists, and the philosophy of Anaximander and Heraclitus. Fate as an "eternal continuous and ordered movement"²² was transmuted into the notion of an intelligent immanent world course. "God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus."²³ Fate became rational order; destiny became law. It was the law of the only natural city, that is, the world. Its law was the natural law—the perfect constitution of the cosmos as polis.²⁴ Stoicism had through Sulla and Cicero and then later under Antonius Pius and Macus Aurelius a profound effect upon the interpretation of Roman law, ameliorating its harshness and supporting the rights especially of its second class citizens in the name of natural law. But for the most part its concept of political virtue was shaped by Cynicism and those things with which justice is concerned were for Stoicism in general of the class of the *adiaphora* toward which the reasonable attitude is that of apathy. In its classic form Stoicism began

²²Chrysippus *ap.* Plutarch *de placit. phil.* i. 28.

²³Diogenes Laertius, vii. 135.

²⁴Cf. Clement of Alexandria *Stromata* iv. 26.

with Zeno and ended with Seneca as an individualistic ethic. Zeno is supposed to have written his work on the state on a dog's tail. No political theory could be more "Cynical." The real connection between natural law and positive law for the Stoic was to be sought in the individual as the citizen of the Cosmos. Under nomos he might be a slave—and that was of no real importance—but by nature, and this was all-important, he was a free and equal citizen of the world. Nomos belonged for the most part to that realm over which he had no control and therefore concerning which he need have no real interest. "The fates," says Seneca, "lead us forth and send us out for of old it was ordained whereat you should rejoice or weep."

With respect to comprehensiveness of concept and specificity of norms the theory of Thomas Aquinas is the only complete natural law formulated in Western thought, and in this respect it is significantly different from all classical theories.²² Beginning with Patristic developments, a third and most important category of law is added to the classical notions of the natural and the positive. This is the Divine Law, the course and ground of the natural law which is then by application the source of the positive. Both the divine and the natural belong to the eternal law which is implanted in the essential nature of man and constitutes the order of the world. The content of the natural law with respect to morality is known in the Decalogue which Thomas defines in this connection as constituting the essential conclusions for the simple reason. Though the most important commandments of the Natural Law, the injunctions of the first table (commandments 1 through 3) are less evident to reason than the last seven, and were, therefore, given through a special promulgation. Through them justice is fulfilled. The seven laws of the second table are based upon and interpreted by the three laws of the first. Only deductions in accordance with reason from the first table belong to the category of the immutable. Practical reason in account with particular situations must alter the further deductions theoretically formulated from the last seven in conformity with the unalterable and universal norms of the first three.

The revealed law supplements the natural as grace perfects nature. Natural reason can indeed illumine the inadequacy of the end of man as known by reason, and hence point to the revealed law which alone discloses man's true end.

²²Cf. Heinrich Rommen, *The Natural Law*, tr. T. R. Hanley, O.S.B., (London: B. Herder, 1947), pp. 45 ff.

The crucial problem here is again the question, is Thomistic natural law natural at all in the proper sense? The content of that law is revealed, not divined by reason. The fact that the second table may be evident to reason seems a begging of the question. Historically the synthesis of natural and revealed was fraught with many possibilities of conflict. Though for Thomas himself these appeared to be minimal, he was explicit concerning the prior claim of the revealed over the natural and the primacy of the Church as the interpreter of both laws and the judge of conflicting legal opinion. As the autonomy of reason was in classical thought prey to the heteronomy of the "wise ruler" so the autonomy of reason in Thomas was to become a basis for the heteronomy of the Church.

Modern theory is concerned primarily with the rights of the individual and the political regime is justified only on the grounds that it protects and supports these rights. Secondly, the source of natural law is found in the reason but in the sentiments of the passions of men. Thus sociology and psychology rather than philosophy provide the source and shape of modern natural law. Man in the state of nature is a passionate individualist. According to Locke, he enters into civil society (which for modern theorists takes the place of the state of grace in patristic and medieval systems) to protect the property acquired in the state of nature. Rousseau is explicit: natural right is to be found in anthropology, i.e. in the structure of the passions which are more basic and hence more powerful in man than reason. The natural virtue of compassion is by convention almost obliterated and in its place are inculcated vanity and pride. Justice, then, is the goal of that best regime wherein the compromise between primitive individualism and the institutions of civilized society is the artificial, i.e. most in accord with nature. Law, particularly the law of the monarchial state, must give way to that democracy in which custom is allowed to develop in terms of natural inclinations free from the restraints of imposed and artificial conventions. In due course custom freely evolved in accordance with nature will mythologize its ideals and create a civil religioin. In that golden age there will be no need for conventional law, civil religion as the ideal of custom will again be king. So we have come full circle around to custom from which all natural law theory had its origin. The new Moira will be transmuted, not to a concept of order as reason but to a concept of inevitable progress.

The history of natural law theory raises the question as to whether there ever was in a proper sense any natural law theory at all. The

variety of attempted theories (Moira as Might, as Reason, as Passion) and the variety of deductions from thee several universal norms cannot be taken as evidence that no natural law exists. Variety and conflict can, however, justify the question as to whether any theory of natural law or any formulation of its content can claim to be universal. They can justify the further question whether in the nature of the concept of natural law there is not the condition that its formulation will always be a seeking—never a finding. If our examination of historic natural law theories has asked the right questions and found responsive answers, we may venture the conclusion that Western civilization has produced no natural law theory in the proper sense. *In a proper sense* is in terms of (1) the historic claims made for natural law in distinction and in relation to positive law, and (2) the necessary meaningful notion of natural law with respect both to philosophy and to the life of man in society. The articles of a proper doctrine of natural law would then be the following:

1. That nature supplies a universal norm of moral value either in terms of nature as cosmos or nature as man and in its structure sanctions that norm.
2. That this norm can be discovered by man independently of cultural and religious orientations.
3. That the norm as apprehended can be articulated in terms of universal human experience.
4. That the norm is of such a nature as to permit theoretical deductions.
5. That these deductions in themselves can serve as middle axioms unequivocably relevant to concrete problems of moral and political virtue.

II. HISTORY VS. NATURE

Since the latter part of the last century natural law theory has been attacked on the grounds that history rather than the philosophy of nature is the appropriate discipline for the study of man. The force of this attack lies in the assertion of the relativity of philosophy itself, in accord with the Kantian critique of theoretical reason as well as the conclusions of the new school of history. There can be no knowledge outside the context of a culture. All knowledge is relative to its historic context, and all attempts at validation must of necessity be simply a rehearsal of the perspective within which it emerged. Kant's rejection of the objective validity of the theoretical concepts of God, world, and

soul anticipated historicism's critique of philosophy as the unwarranted identification of Being with being intelligible, thereby limiting Being to that which can be an object of knowledge. Historicism pointed up also the unwarranted assumption that *to be* is *to be always*. Pre-Kantian ontology had proceeded on the presupposition that reality is theoretically knowable and from this deduced that it must be immutable. Both Kant and the historicists were stating in somewhat less vivid language Luther's criticism of Scholasticism.

Luther's issue with philosophy was simply that whenever it was let in the Bible was left out. "Aristotle and not the Gospel was victorious in scholasticism,"²²⁸ that is to say, that the Aristotelian and the biblical views of nature, God, and man are radically different and that the Thomistic attempt to structure the Christian view according to the categories of Greek philosophy had led to a distortion of theology and an unbiblical view of divine law. For Thomas, following Aristotle, the world after creation is virtually a self-existing being teleologically moved by an immanent rational principle. This principle is the divine law, eternal, unalterable, because it derives from the Divine reason. In the biblical view the unity, order, and consistency of the world are guaranteed in the will of God. The divine imperative is not an immanent law of nature but a calling of man to Himself as a personal relationship, not simply of man's mind but of his heart and will.²²⁹

Greek and medieval philosophy ignored the realm of history as the meaningless or at best cyclical flux of events. Biblical thought emphasizes contrariwise the realm of history as the area of the most significant divine-human encounter in which the events of God's disclosure

²²⁸Richard Kroner, *The Primacy of Faith*, (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 27. Cf. pp. 24 ff. and 45 ff. for a provocative comparison of Luther and Kant.

²²⁹Several "ecumenical" symposia have recently been concerned with the problems of Gospel and Law and the relation of biblical concepts of justice and law to the new secular interest in natural law as a guide to positive law in the modern state and to regulative principles for international control. Cf. "The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law" (Treysa Conference) Study Dept. of the World Council of Churches, (Geneva, 1950); A. R. Vidler & W. A. Whitehouse, *Natural Law—A Christian Re-consideration*, (S. C. M. Press, 1948); E. Schlink, "The Theological Problem of Natural Law," Papers of the Ecumenical Institute, IV, (Bossey, 1949); Horton, "Natural Law and International Order," *Christendom* (1944). Schrey, Walz, and Whitehouse, *The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law* (Ecumenical Biblical Studies, No. 3); London: SCM Press, 1955). W. Katz, Wild & Shepherd, *Natural Law and Human Nature* (Nat. Council of the Episcopal Church). Cf. also K. Barth, *Against the Stream*, (London: SCM Press, 1954); C. H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law*, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951). E. Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*, (New York: Harper, 1945); P. Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice*, (Oxford Univ. Press, 1954); Ehrenstrom, M. Dibelius and Others, *Christian Faith and the Common Life*, (New York: Willett, Clark & Co. 1938).

of His will call forth men's total response. The view of the founders of the historicist school has thus an extensive tangency to the biblical in seeing history as the realm of freedom over against nature as the realm of fate or determinism. The Bible does not send men to nature to seek for a knowledge of God either in the heavens above or in the earth beneath or even in the mind of man. Nature is understood as God's creation and therefore does reflect his righteousness. But this belief is based upon the divine self-disclosure in history. Nature as such does not reveal it. Even in the apprehension of the world or God's creation nature remains a mystery. It is a riddle—in fact, an insoluble riddle—in no sense an unambiguous manifestation of God's righteousness or a source of a knowledge of His will. Such is the answer given to Job in the taunting challenge to reason with Leviathan and to wrest an answer from him.²⁸ Nature has neither the sanctity nor the sanction of the word of God spoken in history or lived in the Word made flesh.

Hence the sanctity of all law in the sanctity of the Holiness of God about which nature can speak only ambiguously. While the Bible shows little interest in the Being of God, with which Scholasticism is primarily concerned, but fixes rather upon His will, Scholasticism, seeking to ground the analogical relation of nature to God finds its most solid support in reason and avoids therefore the arbitrariness of will. Scholasticism then is bound to nature as is the Bible to history.

Revelation reaches us in the context of a particular culture, of particular men, and of all the concreteness of the moment of their hearing and the moment of their witness. It is set in the midst of the particular historical task. It relates man not primarily to causes or to ideas but to persons, to the neighbor, the stranger, the enemy. Precisely because revelation is always inextricably connected with concrete situations it is suffused wth a richness of meaning that could never be signified in either communicated truth or theoretical propositions. It challenges, therefore, the emotions and the will as well as the reason. It challenges the whole man and it demands a total response of the whole person. This grasps at the meaning of "Christian Faith" in the New Testament and in Luther as a living, restless tension relationship between God and man. Insight into the will of God comes through this restless relationship as a revolution of former insights and norms.

²⁸Job 41:1 ff.

Revelation of God's will in the Bible and in our own experience is never so much like a deduction as it is a shaking of the foundations.

I must confess that I find basic difficulties in Professor Brunner's attempt to construct a new kind of natural law theory with an interweaving of Patristic, Reformation, and Neo-Orthodox elements.²⁹ The absolute norm is defined as God's order of creation. On its objective side it is the law of the being of each creature and of its relations to other creatures. It is known in the orders of creation which must be regarded as constants preserved in spite of man's sin. On the subjective side it is the universally human awareness, in some apparently undefinable sense, of these orders of creation quite apart from a revealed knowledge of the Creator. Brunner's vagueness on this point is remarkable. When he discusses these orders he mentions only two: (1) the mythical order of the state "in the sense of the most comprehensive ordering of the community" that is anterior to coercive law; and (2) marriage. In marriage the absolute justice of the order of creation is exemplified. The exposition is based upon the incident of Jesus' answer to the question put to Him by the Pharisees concerning divorce. He elicits from them the Mosaic injunction that "a bill of divorce" may be executed and thereby the husband may put away his wife. Jesus' answer furnishes the key to the notion of marriage as an order of creation: "For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female . . . so then they are no more twain but one flesh. What therefore God had joined together, let not man put asunder." Jesus is quoting from Moses, that is, the Pentateuch (Gen. 1:27; 2:24) to parry the quotation from Moses offered by the Pharisees. Now, according to Brunner, this is the clear word of the creational order of marriage which is absolute and defines absolute justice. "What is truly just is clear—indissoluble marriage" . . . "It is equally clear that this absolute justice is based on the order of creation." But Brunner does not tell us in what sense marriage is an order of creation. Does he mean that it has its biological basis in creation? No, he means that the order of marriage in creation is definite and it is absolute: marriage is indissoluble. He further explicitly indicates that this applies to every marriage act, not to the order or the institution of marriage. In the first place, this is a very questionable exegesis. Brunner does not usually approach the Bible as a fundamentalist. He knows and, I am

²⁹Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*, Part I. See especially sections 4-8 and 12-15.

sure, accepts the fact, that the Deuteronomic Code represented in this very particular a tightening of the marriage bond in the line of greater protection for the wife, not a loosening of it. Earlier practice had permitted an even more hasty and unjust treatment of the wife. If we ought not to criticize Brunner's exegesis here any more than we ought to censure Jesus for not having anticipated the contribution of Graf and Wellhausen we are still left with some disturbing questions: Was it monogamous marriage that was the order of marriage in creation? And if monogamous, was it the structure of the conjugal rather than the consanguine family? Brunner would probably answer yes to both but he would do so on the grounds that conjugal monogamy is the ideal pattern of his cultural horizon. From all that we know about the structure of marriage, both from our most ancient sources and among the contemporary primitives, the ideal of a stable and permanent monogamous contract has been a hard won victory over a natural order of the property concept of womanhood and over the physiological, economic, and political determinants of cultures. I would raise as a sincere and sober issue the question of whether the indissolubility of marriage is not open to modification according to the higher concepts and demands of conjugal monogamy. The strongest argument for the absolute justice of the indissoluble marriage can be made within the context of the consanguine and polygamous structure. The presupposition of Brunner's notion of the orders of creation as the natural law of absolute justice and the relative laws of divine justice later revealed through Moses (the last seven commandments) upon which positive law can be based is the myth of the Fall. That myth has, to be sure, an honored and indispensable function in the Hebrew-Christian doctrine of man and of nature as it has also in the Pythagorean-Orphic-Platonic tradition. It stands to remind us that we must start with the view of man as sinner. It has other values as well but it does not justify an unhistorical interpretation of human culture nor unwarranted presuppositions with respect to pre-historical man. In its original forms it was as much an element of ancient cultural horizons as the myth of the golden third age is in the modern world. I would venture the further suggestion that the doctrine of original sin as its color and shape appear in the New Testament and in the early Fathers owes more to Post-Testamental and Hellenistic Judaism than it does to the main currents of Pentateuchal and Prophetic literature. Here no myth was needed to remind man that the magnitudes of every age are not sacred. They are, however, subject to God and as both good and evil can

serve as instruments of His purpose. The whole discussion of orders of creation as a biblical concept both in medieval and contemporary theology is riddled with ambiguity and vitiated by eisegetical constructs. Nowhere are these orders clearly delineated or defined and everywhere there is a remarkable innocence of the sense of history.²⁰

The burden of Professor Brunner's reconstruction of a Christian "natural law" is, moreover, in the last analysis an argument for a Christian positivism. Since the Fall, and that is to say in history, the absolute justice of the orders of creation is not only utterly beyond fulfillment for sinful man in a wounded world, it cannot any longer be regarded as even the ideal of worldly justice. To apply it to the world as it is would create gross injustice. Jesus was not then, in Brunner's exposition, criticizing the law of Moses permitting divorce. "On the contrary," says Brunner, He justified Moses." In the system of positive law, relative justice is superior to absolute justice, that is, it is more just, because absolute justice would from the outset be no more than a fiction, a lie, and an outrage on life. There is nothing immutable in the historical order but every doctrine of natural law or of divine justice in terms of law is by necessity static. "The very immutability of divine law is decisive in this connection."²¹ But justice itself must be in account with the dynamic reality of history. Hence positive law in king. He rejects the medieval doctrine that in the conflict of natural with positive law the latter is invalidated and no longer obligatory. Two legal systems side by side yet claiming each for itself the sovereign rule would be intolerable. Such conflict could result only in a travesty of all justice. Brunner sides therefore with Luther and Paul in a conservative attitude toward the law of the State.

There can be no disagreement with Professor Brunner's emphasis upon the absolute justice of God and the need for such a locus of commitment in all jurisprudence and in all life under law. It would seem, however, that the biblical symbol of God's Holiness or the Divine Imperative of love as the source and end of all virtue, personal and political, is the more fitting symbol, more appropriate in its form and less ambiguous in its content than the notion of the orders of creation.

²⁰Cf. M. Dibelius, "The Message of the New Testament and the Orders of Human Society" in *Christian Faith and the Common Life*, pp. 19 ff. Brunner has exhausted his biblical sources with the illustration of the orders in marriage. A consistent liberalism would have even here urged greater caution. Marriage was not from the beginning. Eve and marriage belong in the biblical narrative not to creation but to history. Eve was a desideratum of Adam's and an afterthought of God's.

²¹Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

That opposition to the law of nature "has not only prepared the way for the totalitarian state, but made it possible,"²² seems not only an illogical but an unhistorical opinion. The rationale of the Third Reich in *Mein Kampf* is, in part, based upon the law of the orders of nature—they are neither biblical nor are they rational but they are presented as self-evident and obvious to every realistic naturalist and philosopher. "Nature is prodigal with individual life and considerate only for the development of the species."²³ The injustice here is the same against which Brunner warns in the application of the orders of creation to the historical process: the transference of the implications of a "man-in-nature" theory to law governing "man-in-history." There are some supporters of the orders of creation based on the Bible who would agree with Hitler that race is one of the orders of nature and that a particular relation of the races is therein clearly indicated. It ought also to be borne in mind that the modern world has not been the only arena of the totalitarian state. It has existed with the blessings of "natural law" even of "Christian natural law." Nor were Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia the only contemporary totalitarian regimes of the preceding decade. We ought never to forget that many of those now cherished things which men like Brunner and Rommen are concerned to protect by the revival of natural law against the threats of positivism now belong to our sense of right (toleration, democracy, political liberty, equality of legal status) because men indelibly tarred with the pitch of heresy, secularism, and positivism opposed thee Church, the clergy, and natural law in the name and for the sake of a principle that outraged current notions of the absolute norms of natural justice.

There is, I believe, a kind of Christian positivism. It involves the tension between the created goods of our most cherished insights—apprehensions of the will of God which have broadened the horizon of our moral vision while deepening and sharpening the focus of the tasks near at hand and the hidden God Who is the source of goodness. The Christian life is the restless living faith in the Giver, not the gifts. It is trust that God's grace in each concrete situation will be sufficient, the faith that can wait upon the Lord, knowing the God can no more relieve us of the responsibility for discovery of the right than He can relieve us of the occasion of moral decision or of the responsibility of action.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 88.

²³Cf. Butterfield, *Christianity and History*, (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1950), p. 6.

A sense of history has supplied in part this awareness of the dynamic and the indeterminate in the texture of human life. It has enabled us to find value in the unique and the concrete. Few would deny that it has brought into view a facet of reality which was denied to classical thought. But historicism too is a partial view. It can degenerate into a relativism which leaves only chance or fate as a final principle of explanation. It is only part, though from our point of view a very important part, of the preparation for divining the will of God or the notion of the right. History raises rather than supplants the ontological question. History, too, has its background, as the drama has its stage and its scene. History raises the question of nature.

III. NATURE AS HISTORY

We have been discussing the dichotomy of nature and history in terms of the Greek and medieval views of nature. When we speak of nature today we may have several concepts in mind but none of them will be the Greek notion of *physis*. We simply cannot, except for academic purposes, empty our minds of the influence of modern science which has formed our world of nature. The Greek notion is for us only an abstraction, the "rational order of the universe" is in no real sense our notion of the law of nature. Nor do we think of nature as essence. We no longer make the sharp distinction so congenial to Greek thought between reality and history. Aristotle's statement that poetry is more significant, more true to life than history, catches us off balance. We have to stop and think what he meant. The classical study of nature cancelled out history, regarding it as an invalid form of thought or at least irrelevant to the philosophical concern.

Nor can we think about nature today in the traditional theological sense as simply the arena of God's redemptive work. It is no longer for us, as Professor Raven remarked in his Gifford Lectures, "a mere setting, itself subsidiary and irrelevant . . . but an integral and essential part of the play."²⁴ The rigid dichotomies of the Patristic and Medieval and seventeenth century mind have lost a large measure of their relevance in our time. The natural and the revealed, reason and experience are no longer true opposites. We cannot draw as clearly or as certainly the line between natural theology and revelation or between philosophy and theology as did they.²⁵

²⁴*Natural Religion and Christian Theology*, I, p. 20.

²⁵Philosophy in our century has been concerned with both nature and history, not as two different forms of thought but as two expressions of the same thought.

There is here disclosed an aspect of the fact and the nature of the ontological concern in our time. Historicism has vitiated the classical ontology based upon the equation of Being with being intelligible, and, though it can supply insights into the nature of the problem and even directions of approach, it cannot by its very nature provide the final answer. Historicism has in fact tended to present the problem as inconsistent but insoluble.³⁰ The new approach of nature as history can relate the problem of value to the question of ontology, since it is concerned with the fabric of basic elements as well as the structure of their dynamic relationship.

Can, then, nature as history be the basis for the formulation of a more adequate and relevant theory of natural law, that is, can a new theory of natural law be devised in terms of the structure of the process or of the structure of creativity within the process? Whitehead answers in the negative: "The notion of the unqualified stability of particular laws of nature and of particular moral codes is a primary illusion which has vitiated much philosophy."³¹ To put the issue in our terms—this is a primary implication of nature as history. What then can be said of the accordance of value to fact in the apprehension of reality as process?

An important aspect of his doctrine of process is an emphasis upon and an explanation of the emergence of novelty. We can, I believe, by this emphasis measure the distance between the views of reality as process and as reason. Of decisive importance in the latter is the element of the unalterable, immutable, and eternal. Thus the primitive notions of Moira, Heimarmene, and Ananke even as transmuted in classical and Patristic-Medieval philosophy into reason are categorically denied. So also is the 17th and 18th century scientific view of the rigidly and universally conditioned determinative system of cause and effect.³² It is, on the other hand, in closer accord with the biblical view of the Living God and of the openness of creation to His purposes. A second implication of process is that God is related, or rather inextricably and radically immanent in the world in terms of activity. The narrow concept of Being as being intelligible is thereby trans-

Existence and essence which were for so many centuries the two ontological categories have become inadequate in answering the basic metaphysical question. Cf. John Wild, *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law*, pp. 199 ff.

³⁰Cf. M. Weber, *Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 152 ff. and *Religionsoziologie*, I, p. 82.

³¹*Modes of Thought*, p. 18.

³²Cf. Raven, *op. cit.* I, p. 191.

cended; event with all the richness of the concrete and the related rather than substance is the basic category of explanation.

The points of Whitehead's thought that impinge upon the moral life of man and the moral ground of society are strikingly correlative to the biblical view of man's life in relation to the calling of God's righteousness. If we are in each case dealing with a valid perspective, we may claim support for the biblical critique of natural law from the standpoint of a sense of history in terms of nature as history.

Natural law raises two crucial questions which are essentially related: (1) the accordance of value with fact; and (2) the nature of the relevance of the abstract to the particular. We have attempted to examine the issues raised by these questions in terms of the relation of nature and history, and have been led by this line of enquiry to understand the ambiguity, confusion, and significance of the concept of moral norms in terms of two categories of the natural (1) as Moira, and (2) as history.

Nature as Moira reflects the closed system of the folk society. Its attention is centered on concepts of the immutable and the static. Its insight is in the perception of order and thereby led to interpret the dynamic in terms of absolute sanctions and all events in terms of cyclical occurrence or the intrusion of evil. Here the correspondence of absolute norms to fact is maximal. This perspective tends toward the exclusive emphasis upon one aspect of experience: power, reason, or passion, and in part because of this, poignantly perceives the disparity between physis and nomos, between nature and history, between the individual and society, between meaning and experience.

Nature viewed as history reflects the indeterminacy of the free society. Its attention is focused upon the dynamic aspects of nature and the occasions of novelty as well as the structures effecting order and constancy. It values freedom and adventure more than peace, and tends therefore to regard norms as regulative principles which are themselves subject to revision in an ongoing converse with nature and history in the concrete situations. This concept of reality as dynamic with elements of indeterminacy is pervasive in contemporary thought. Whatever neo-this or that a contemporary philosopher or theologian may be his thought reflects both the sense of history and the organic view of nature that characterizes our horizon. It seems to me most evident in the apologetic of Catholic Orthodoxy where such terms as immutable and impassible are defended as axiological rather than ontological categories. In the support of Thomist natural law theory

contemporary authors seem somehow more apologetic than evangelic.

This leads directly to a second implication of nature viewed as history, namely the concept of the historical character of human thought. The idea of natural law in the classical sense lives and moves and has its being against the horizon of the "character of importance" that was the shape and colour of Greek life in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ. That it is true of 17th century science has become apparent. That our own science is similarly related to a horizon is likely to be rejected by everyone except our foremost scientists. The program of the Institute of Higher Studies at Princeton reflects this discovery. Professor Collingwood's study of the idea of nature in western thought arrives at this conclusion: "A scientific theory not only rests on certain historical facts; it is itself an historical fact." The historical character of human thought is, of course, far more evident in the areas of philosophy and ethics. When one reads now the 18th century Christian apologists he is not so much impressed with their conclusions as he is with the similarity of their premise to that of their opponents. In the answers that are given to the perennial problems of philosophy and ethics the content can be more significant than the form. What "in accordance with nature" meant to the Stoics it cannot possibly mean to us. It is an abstraction now. It was a powerful, living idea in the Hellenistic age. The historical character of human thought explains the ambiguity we have encountered in the term *nature* and in the phrase "natural law." "Every fair and every war" wrote Jean Paul Richter, "brings forth a new natural law." We are not to conclude that the fact of difference invalidates all formulations of natural law or the concept of natural law itself. We must, however, raise the question of what the meaning of absolute norms can be outside the context of the horizon against which they were formulated.

One conclusion which, it seems to me, must be drawn from the history of natural law theory is the need expressed universally for regulative principles. All law appears to live by the roots of some extra-legal referent. The essential formal meaning of absolute norms in the sense of nature as Moira, however, is not relevant to our world of nature, of science, of history, of theology. Dogmatic assertion either in terms of Thomism or 18th century rationalism does not put any living water into this empty vessel.

Natural law is, however, not only meaningful but essential in terms of regulative moral principles.

1. This is an implication of the kind of answers given in the light

of our science to the ontological question. From the other pole of the enquiry, law neither is nor can be less committed to the significance of fact in our time than in any other.

2. This enquiry concerning regulative principles must be as widely inclusive as the area of our cultural interest. Nature as history makes evident the relevance of all disciplines to the discovery of moral value. The fact of the historic variety of natural law theories—custom, might, reason, passion, urges the cooperative effort of the natural and social scientist, the psychologist, the philosopher, and the theologian. No one discipline can claim nor can it, without grave risk, be granted the authority to formulate and interpret regulative norms. The philosopher king is likely to defend Socrates with the weapons of Thrasymachus.

3. When nature is viewed as history the clear line between "natural" and "positive" is less evident. What is basic in the structure of history belongs also to the structure of nature. Regulative principle is discovered within concrete situations as well as applied to particular problems. In our world the moral life is a life of adventure. We shoud fervently pray that it may be an adventure of spiritual fulfillment. Here especially to be poor in spirit is to be rich indeed.

PERSONALIST CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS

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Personalism is a philosophical system according to which the whole world consists of persons or selves created by God,—either actual, such as man, or potential; i.e. capable of eventually developing into actual persons. An actual person is a being capable of cognitive activity, possessed of the idea of the absolute values of truth, moral goodness and beauty, and conscious of the duty to realize these values in his conduct. The philosophy of Leibniz is a form of personalism; the system of personalism worked out by me is a synthesis of Neoplatonism and Leibniz's theory. Some of my views differ from the traditional Christian doctrine, but they do not contradict the dogmas of the Orthodox, the Roman and the Protestant Churches. The purpose of the present article is to show that the fundamental truths of Christianity

may be included in a system of philosophy remote from the teachings usually met with in theology.

The idea of the existence of God lies at the basis of a religious conception of the world. It calls forth decisive opposition on the part of people who have no aptitude for metaphysics and, owing to some emotional or intellectual bias, do not want God to exist; such people distrust religious experience. And yet there is a very simple argument that proves the reality of God. The world consists of beings mutually interconnected by a multitude of relations, so that it forms a systematic whole. It must therefore be admitted that there exists a correlator who creates the world as a system, but Himself transcends system; for if He too formed part of a system, the question would again arise as to the origin of that system, and another, higher correlator would have to be postulated. As transcending all system, He is not expressible by any ideas borrowed from the world-system: He is not a person, is not a spirit, is not a being, and so on; to put it shortly, He is the Divine Nothing. This is how He is spoken of in the *negative* (apophatic) Christian theology, worked out systematically by pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. True, negative theology is supplemented by the positive (*kataphatic*), which, on the basis of the revelation and religious experience, speaks of God as a personal being and affirms that although He is one in essence, He is a Trinity of Persons—God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost.

There is no contradiction between these two kinds of theology: it is precisely the trinitarian dogma which shows that in speaking of God as a Person, a Spirit, a Being and so on, we use these ideas merely by way of analogy—of *metalogical* analogy, i.e. one excluding the possibility of identity between the nature of God and any aspect of the world's being. In using these ideas we only mean that the values indicated by them exist in God, but in so superior a form that they are not comparable to our qualities. Thus, even when we have recourse to the categories of positive theology, we still remain, at bottom, in the realm of negative theology, and there is nothing anthropomorphic in the Christian teaching about God.

Intellectuals, who in early youth undergo a religious crisis and lose faith in God, but in later years begin to seek Him, are often attracted by the Buddhist conception of the Nirvana or by Lao-Tse's doctrine of the Tao; they are drawn to the negative theology of Buddhism and Taoism because it is entirely free from anthropomorphism. They are, however, profoundly mistaken in seeking wisdom in oriental religions;

Christianity contains the eastern wisdom and in addition to it develops, on the basis of a richer religious experience, a close and living bond with God and an intimate worship of Him. It supplements the teaching about God by the idea of the absolute good realized in the divine kingdom and by the conception of the absolute value of each individual as a being unique in its existence, irreplaceable in value and having personal immortality. A Christian cannot accept the Buddhist contention that the soul as an eternal individual entity does not exist, or the idea common to many Hindu philosophies that at the basis of every individual personality there is the universal personality, "atman," so that each of us is, as it were, a ramification of the *atman*. According to the Christian teaching every individual self is an independent person created by God as a reality other than He.

In addition to the intellectual ascent from the world-system to God as a Principle which transcends all system, there is a more intimate way of communion with God, a "meeting" with Him, beautifully described in its essential features in Rudolf Otto's book *Das Heilige*. There are cases, says Otto, when man suddenly feels that he has before him something "utterly different," incommensurable with the world, something that calls forth a tremor of awe (*mysterium tremendum*), fascinating and entralling us with its excellence. To seek intellectual proofs of the existence of God in the face of such religious experience, says Solovyov, is as absurd as to doubt the existence of the sun while gazing at woods and meadows bathed in sunlight.

God is incomparable to the world, being "utterly different" in the sense of "metalogical difference" (a term invented by S. L. Frank). Hence the Christian doctrine that God created the world "out of nothing" is perfectly true, though grammatically badly expressed. God did not take "nothing" as a kind of material out of which He created the world; no such absurdity is implied in the doctrine in question. Its meaning is very simple. God does not need any material given to Him from without, nor does He need to transfer anything from Himself outwards: before the creation of the world there was no material of any kind external to God and, as God transcends all system, nothing can be transferred from Him outwards. Hence, God creates the world as something new, completely other than Himself (metalogically different). Human creativeness always needs some material, either given from outside (bricks, marble, etc.) or borrowed from past experience. And yet in so far as we introduce into the world something that was not there before—even if it be only a movement of my hand taking up

my pen at a certain moment and in a certain place—our activities, too, contain, in however small a degree, an element of creativeness out of nothing.¹

Being absolutely perfect, God created only entities endowed with properties the correct use of which leads to absolute goodness so that they may be found worthy of deification by grace and be admitted into God's Kingdom. Such entities are persons.

Everyone can discover the essence of personality if he learns to analyze his experiences in such a way as to observe his self. He will then notice that his feelings, desires, thoughts and actions arise in time and disappear into the past, but his actual self does not arise and disappear in time: it remains the same self and therefore has no temporal form. Indeed, our self transcends time, so that to a certain extent it disposes of time and creates it as a form of his experiences; thus, in singing it imposes a temporal, longer or shorter form upon the different notes of the aria that is being sung. It may therefore be said that the human self is a *supertemporal*, and of course also a *superspatial* being. I impose a spatial form upon some of my actions, e.g. the movement of my hand, but I as such have no spatial form.²

A second important property of the self is its creative power. I create, for instance, my acts of attention as I listen to faint sounds of music, I create my voluntary actions—e.g. write a letter. True, I do this in collaboration with my body, but the initiative comes from me.

Our self is both the creator and the bearer of its manifestations and also of the characteristics expressed in them, such as courage, cowardice, generosity, avarice, etc. A supertemporal being, the creator and the bearer of its qualities and of their manifestations in time is designated in philosophy by the term "substance." I prefer to use the term "substantival agent" in order to emphasize its active character.

Being supertemporal, every substantival agent, i.e. every self has individual personal immortality from its very nature which God created as supertemporal. In reference to this, Leibniz says that it is not our immortality which is a miracle, but, on the contrary, complete annihilation of our being would be a miraculous act of divine omnipotence.

God endowed substantival agents with a *superqualitative* creative

¹F. C. Schiller's paper *Creation, emergence, novelty* in the Aristotelian Society Proceedings for 1930 shows the necessity of this idea for our conception of the world.

²Concerning these properties of our self see my book *A Popular Introduction to Philosophy* (in Russian) ch. 2. Publ. by Possiev, 1956.

power: He did not make some creatures stupid and others intelligent, some brave and others cowardly, and so on. All these qualities, exemplifying the agents' character, or their type of life, are developed by the agents themselves. Even such types of life as are represented by being an electron, an atom of oxygen, a molecule of water, a plant, an animal, a man, etc. are developed by substantival agents themselves in the course of evolution. Such a theory is not in contradiction with the Book of Genesis, which says that first of all God created heaven and earth. These words may be interpreted as follows. God created agents, some of which entered at once the right path of conduct, loving God more than themselves, and their neighbour, i.e. all other agents, as themselves; these are 'the heaven,' that is, the Kingdom of God. Other created agents, striving like the first for the fulness and wealth of life, seek to realize it for themselves, giving scarcely a thought to any other beings and even entering into hostile relations with some of them. This is "earth," i.e. the Kingdom of selfish sinful beings who create an impoverished life instead of a full and rich one. The life of a free electron, a proton and such like agents is the result of the utmost isolation from other beings, leading to an extremely simplified type of conduct.

All selfish beings strive for the fulness of life and, discontented with their impoverished condition, keep seeking new types of life, i.e. enter upon the path of evolution. The Genesis story of the world's creation in six days tells of evolution, every new stage of which, valuable for the further development of life, is realized with the help of God's creative activity. Thus, God's command "let there be light" is the creation of the idea of light which is adopted by the created agents and realized by them in the form of temporal light processes.

Selfish substantival agents are able to develop because each of them performs not only external spatial actions, but also has an inner life. At the lower stages of nature this inner life is so elementary that its manifestations may be called *psychoid*, in contradistinction to our psychical processes. An electron repels other electrons but attracts protons, and this is possible because even such elementary beings unconsciously feel one another to be of positive or of negative value, and act purposively in response to these values. Thus, there are no purely mechanical processes in nature: the agents' external manifestations are either psychoidly-material, or—at higher stages of development—psycho-material actions. Hence, all beings experience their actions as a part of their own life which satisfies or fails to satisfy them, and there-

fore they are capable of development. A fuller life is attained by means of forming alliances: the less developed agents are attracted to the life of a more developed one, and in alliance with him, and serving as his organs, become capable of creating together a more complex type of life. Thus atoms are formed out of electrons, protons, etc., then molecules, stars, solar systems. On our planet Earth and under its guidance, molecules are formed into unicellular organisms, and later on into multicellular plants and animals.

The creative power of all substantival agents is superqualitative; therefore their will is free³—even the will of such entities as electrons. God endowed all beings with free creative power, because freedom of will is a necessary condition of the possibility of the absolute good, namely, of a life guided by a love for God greater than the love for oneself, and by love for one's neighbor as for oneself, and by love for one's neighbor as for oneself. But freedom of will is a fatal gift: it may be a source of evil.

There is evil in our realm of being consisting of agents who sinned by entering the path of egoism, and therefore instead of the fulness of a perfect life have developed a nature full of imperfection and suffering. But even in their fallen sinful state all agents preserve the *image of God*. The words "the image of God" should be applied to the substantival agents' basic attributes, created by God,—namely their supertemporal and superspatial character, superqualitative creative power, freedom of will and also their consubstantiality. Through the correct use of these attributes they are able to create absolute values.

The creatures' consubstantiality may be described as follows. Even an electron performs its acts of attraction and repulsion in accordance with mathematical ideas and the principles of the structure of space and time. Every substantival agent is a bearer of these ideas, which are not similar, but literally *identical* in all of them. Consequently, in that aspect of their being all the agents in the world are joined together and form a single whole. In virtue of this consubstantiality, partial and abstract though it be, there is an intimate existential bond between them all: the experiences of each one exist not for him only, but—if only unconsciously—for all the others as well, presenting a positive or a negative value. In this sense, "everything in the world is immanent in everything else." Hence, if another agent's state has a particularly pleasant or unpleasant significance for me, I can direct

³See my book *Freedom of Will*, translated by N. Duddington. Williams and Norgate, 1932.

upon it my acts of awareness, attention and discrimination, in consequence of which another's existence becomes cognized and observed by me as it is in itself and not as a subjective copy. I call such immediate perception of existence and of its value *intuition*.

There is a profound difference between the *image* and the *likeness* of God. The image of God consists in the above enumerated characteristics of the created substantival agents; it cannot be lost even through the sin of egoism, which leads to an impoverished existence like that of electrons, plants, animals; that which is created by God is indestructible. But the divine *likeness* is a task set by God to His creatures and can only be realized through the agent's own will, of course with the gracious help of the Lord God. The divine likeness has been achieved by such persons who, in loving God more than themselves, and their neighbour, i.e. all cosmic agents, as themselves, are wholly free from egoism, have been found worthy of deification by grace and live in the divine Kingdom in complete unanimity with one another, thus realising *concrete consubstantiality*.

Intuition is possible because, in virtue of their abstract consubstantiality, all creatures are welded together into one organic whole. But there is no consubstantiality between the creatures and the Holy Trinity: there is no element of identity between God and the world. Even the ideas in accordance with which the world is created are no part of the divine being: they are a part of the created being external to God. To include them in the being of God would be contrary to the principles of negative theology. The doctrine I maintain insists on the ontological (existential) abyss between God and the world and is an extreme form of theism, utterly opposed to pantheism. But Christian theism preserves that upon which pantheists set most value, namely God's nearness to the world. God is Love not only within His trinitary life, but also in relation to the world created by Him. In virtue of His superspatial and supertemporal nature He is omnipresent, in the sense that His gracious influence is present in every place and at all times in the life of the world; loving the beings He created, He never forsakes us, though we often turn away from Him.

If there is an existential abyss between God and the world, how are we to explain the fact that we undoubtedly have religious experience and intimate communion with the supercosmic principle, described as "meeting" God? This question can only be answered by referring to the Christian conception of the God-man: the second Person of the Holy Trinity, the Logos, unites human nature with His divine nature.

As the God-man, the Logos is a mediator between the world and the Holy Trinity: in His human nature He is consubstantial with us, the creatures, and in His Divine nature He is consubstantial with God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. Thus, through His mediation, mystical intuition, i.e. religious experience, is possible for us.

Even members of the divine Kingdom can only have religious experience through the Logos as the God-man. Hence it follows that the divine Incarnation took place together with the creation of the world. Of course at that stage of His descent into the world the God-man is not yet Jesus Christ: He is the great Heavenly Man, having not a material but a transfigured body, a member of the Divine Kingdom, standing from the first at the centre of the world's history. Such an interpretation of the doctrine of the God-man may be called *macroanthropocentric* (the Greek word *makros* means "great").

The heavenly God-man came into immediate contact with us, sinful beings, when mankind had been prepared, in the process of historical development, for communion with Him. This second stage of God's descent into the world consists in the heavenly God-man actually assuming material human corporeality and living in Palestine as the God-man Jesus Christ. The traditional doctrine according to which the divine Incarnation took place only two thousand years ago and until then the world had existed without the God-man, may be called *microanthropocentric* (the Greek word *mikros* means "small"). The interpretation worked out in the present essay includes both the macro- and the microanthropocentric doctrines by insisting that two stages should be distinguished in the divine Incarnation: the incarnation of the Logos at the creation of the world when He entered the world as the heavenly God-man, and, at the second stage of His descent into the world, His entrance into the realm of sinful beings as the sinless God-man Jesus Christ.

As already said, substantival agents develop and gradually ascend to a fuller life by forming alliances. An agent who had begun by working out only such an elementary type of life as, for instance that of an electron, may later, on the ground of experience, organize an atom, i.e. of hydrogen; still later he may organize a molecule, e.g. of water; subsequently he may on our Earth organize a unicellular plant or animal such as an ameba; then he may develop the type of life of a multicellular plant or animal. Gradually acquiring more and more complex capacities he may at last create a type of life exemplified, for instance, in the organisms and behaviour of a chimpanzee, an elephant,

a dog, and so on. Such transitions from one type of life to another, with a new body, are *reincarnations*.

After death, i.e. after parting with its body, a substantival agent does not enter another ready-made body, but creates for himself a new one, attracting from his environment the less developed agents who like the type of life worked out by him: they enter into an alliance with him and serve him as his organs. I use the word "body" in two senses. In the first place, it may designate, as is usual, the system of an agent's spatial forms and expressions; secondly, I apply it to the system of allied superspatial agents who serve the chief agent, the organizer of the system, as his organs. In order to distinguish these two senses of the word "body" one may speak of the "spatial body" and the "allied body." Very often, however, no explanatory adjectives are needed, for it is clear from the context which body is meant.

The conception of an allied body is more important than that of a spatial body, because the explanation of most vital processes, especially in the case of such complex beings as plants and animals, requires a knowledge of the allied body's system. Death—an event of great significance—consists in the parting between the chief agent and his allied body; it takes place when the agent begins to need a new body or, on the contrary, when his allies become dissatisfied with his life and forsake him.

Man appears on the Earth as a result of these processes of reincarnation, through the ascent of one of the higher animals from the stage of animality to that of rational humanity. Of course such a step forward takes place not simply by means of a natural evolution, but with the gracious coöperation of God's creative act which, according to the book of Genesis, took place at the end of the sixth day of the creation of the world. Such a theory about the origin of man was worked out by Leibniz. He called God's primary creation of monads (substantival agents) *creatio*; the transition from animality to rational humanity is achieved through a supplementary creative act of God, which Leibniz calls *transcreatio*. He thought that such a theory could be accepted by Christian theologians. A Polish philosopher, Lutoslavski, who died recently, asked the late Cardinal Mercier about the theory of reincarnation and received a letter from him saying that it has not been "formally condemned as a heresy," i.e. has not been discussd by the Catholic Church.

After death the human self builds for itself a new body, corresponding to its stage of development, and lives on earth again as a human

being or enters the sphere of super-human life, e.g. becomes the organizer, and consequently, the soul, of some social unit—a family, a community, a party, a state and so on. The personal identity of the individual is preserved throughout his reincarnations: one and the same supertemporal self ascends to higher and higher stages of evolution on the basis of formerly acquired habits, capacities and interests. The final end of this process is reached when the substantival agent, having experienced the most diverse forms of temptation, completely frees himself from egoism and begins to love the highest value, God, more than himself and all created persons as much as himself. Then deification by grace is vouchsafed to him, and the Lord God introduces him into the divine Kingdom, where the creative powers of his personality are realized in their fulness and absolute value. Thus sooner or later all persons will be saved; not one will be subjected to everlasting suffering in hell.⁴ Suffering exists only in so far and so long as a person remains egoistic.

Every substantival agent is unconsciously connected with the perfect life which will be his in the Kingdom of God. This future perfection is his *normative individual idea* which acts as his conscience without his being aware of it. In so far as every person, even a potential one, has his own normative idea, he is one and the same person at all the stages of his evolution, in all his reincarnations.

The doctrine of universal salvation is not contrary to the dogmas of the Orthodox Church. It has been held by such great Fathers of the Church as St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Maximus the Confessor.

It is usual to distinguish three components in man's nature: spirit, soul and body. According to the personalist theory which I am working out, these three components are three different activities of the human self. In so far as an activity is directed to the creation or the adoption of the absolute values of truth, goodness and beauty, it may be called *spiritual*; in so far as an activity is performed for the sake of attaining relative—egoistic or egocentric—values, it is a *psychical* process. As to the spatial body, according to the dynamistic theory of matter, it is, in the case of selfish beings like us, the system of acts of repulsion performed by our self and its allied agents in order to secure for our exclusive possession a certain portion of space. This comparatively impenetrable body is our *material corporeality* produced by our egoistic acts of repulsion.

⁴Concerning torments of hell see my book *Des conditions de la morale absolue* (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1948), ch. viii.

The resurrection of the body consists in the fact that the human self, freed from egoism, creates for itself in the divine Kingdom not a material but a *transfigured* body, without performing any acts of repulsion. That body consists of light, sound, fragrance and other processes, perfect in their beauty.

The problem of the resurrection of the body contains a number of difficulties indicated by St. Gregory of Nyssa; their solution is to be found in the doctrine that members of the divine Kingdom have bodies which profoundly differ from our limited material bodies.⁵

It is vouchsafed to the members of the divine Kingdom to contemplate the glory of God, and this is the source of their bliss. But their life is not merely a passive contemplation of the Lord God's perfection. The creative power with which God endowed substantival agents is for the first time realized in its perfect individual fulness in the Kingdom of God. Its members' activity consists in creating and absorbing the absolute values of truth, moral goodness and beauty. Having no selfish strivings and possessing a transfigured body in which there are no physiological processes, they do not seek relative values, good in some respects and bad in others. Their life is superbiological and is devoted to the creation of indivisible and imperishable values.

Deification by grace is bestowed only upon such actual persons as have completely overcome their selfishness and fulfil to perfection the chief commandments laid down by Jesus Christ—that is, who love God more than themselves and their neighbours as themselves. Their life is consecrated to the creation of the *absolute good*. As to plants, animals, and the whole of the inorganic nature, those realms of being consist of potential persons. After a series of reincarnations lasting millions of years, they become actual persons, and finally attain perfection culminating in deification by grace. The world is so wisely ordained by the Lord God that all beings develop freely on the basis of their experience and are eventually found worthy of entering the divine Kingdom, the realm of the absolute good.

Many Christians think that not only all perfect actual persons, but also plants and animals, will enter the divine Kingdom and cease to be fierce and predatory like tigers, or parasites like the tape worm, lice or bugs. This idea is connected with the belief that everything in organic nature and also all species of plants and animals were created by God, and that originally there was no struggle for existence in na-

⁵See my article, "Resurrection of the Body," *Anglican Theological Review*, xxxi (1949), 71-82.

ture. Animals were created as good beings, but Adam sinned and, as a result of the fall of man, all creatures underwent a profound change. The whole of nature became full of imperfections, suffering, and a cruel struggle for existence.

It is impossible to agree with such a view. In the first place, it implies that in creating substantival agents God endowed them with definite characteristics, and created electrons, protons, oxygen, iron, chlorine etc. and all the numberless species of plants and animals. If this were the case, every creature's action would be in keeping with its character and, since all that is created by God is indestructible, it would be difficult to develop a theory of free will. Secondly, according to this view, the good nature created by God was spoiled, and spoiled in a very strange way: man sinned, and in consequence lower creatures, perfectly innocent, changed profoundly, and even the anatomical structure of their bodies became different, e.g. adapted to carnivorous and predatory habits; their good and happy life was replaced by a life full of evil and suffering, so that now "all creation groaneth and travaileth together." Thirdly, if the failings and the sufferings of the lower creatures came about not through their fault, but because of the fall of man, theodicy would be impossible and it would have to be said that since God permits injustice, He is either not omnipotent, or not omniscient, or not all-good. The view we have been considering is contrary both to science and to the Christian conception of God.

According to the theory of personalism, as worked out by me, God did not create the character, i.e. the type of life, of the substantival agents created by Him. He endowed them with a superqualitative and free creative power, and they work out their qualities (i.e. their type of life) themselves; hence, they are responsible for the characteristics they have developed. God participates in this process in so far as He helps to originate qualities that have some element of goodness. All the agents outside the Divine Kingdom are fallen creatures, that is, beings who have entered the path of egoism, and therefore have brought about our realm of being, full of suffering and imperfection. Only sinful beings suffer, and they do so through their own fault.⁶

People who believe that not only perfect persons, but also plants and animals will enter the divine Kingdom, probably arrive at this conclusion in the following way. They love our realm of being, which

⁶See my book *Des conditions de la morale absolue*, chapters on "Absolute Moral Responsibility" and "Sanctions of the Moral Law," and also my theodicy, *God and Cosmic Evil*.

in spite of its defects has many good qualities, much beauty and diversity of life. They think that there will be a Last Judgment which will put an end to our sinful world; and since they love that world, they hope that it will be brought into the divine Kingdom in an ennobled aspect, in the form of plants and animals which will have become good. Those who out of love for our realm of being wish to preserve it forever in a different form may find comfort in the thought that the words of Jesus Christ about the Last Judgment can be interpreted as referring to our solar system only, and not to the world as a whole. Catastrophic destructions happen at different times in different parts of the universe, but in such a manner that the realms inhabited by sinful creatures outside the divine Kingdom are preserved forever. Beings who attain perfection leave our world and enter the Divine Kingdom, and their place is occupied by new substantival agents whom the Lord God brings into the historical process. Therefore the different aspects of life in our realm of being will always exist, and members of the divine Kingdom will be able to admire all that is positive in them and, indeed, to perceive them far more fully than we do. The divine Kingdom is not in some far off place: it surrounds us, but we are unable to perceive it while our nervous system is in its normal state, adapted to our poor everyday needs. Accordingly we do not realize to what extent members of the divine Kingdom enter into our life. Every creature, every locality, every people has its own guardian-angel. Many actions that are of essential significance to our life are done by us at the subconscious suggestion of a guardian-angel. In some particularly important cases the Lord God sends some saint, for instance St. Nicholas, to perform a miracle. The highest manifestations of beauty are rays of the divine Kingdom, penetrating into our realm of being. The world of creatures similar to us, in the sense of being egoistic and therefore imperfect, will always exist and be an object of perception for members of the divine Kingdom who will exercise their gracious influence upon it.

The metaphysics of personalism glorifies God in the highest possible way. It teaches that God does not create anything imperfect: He did not create tigers, boa constrictors, tape worms etc.; all such types of life, and all imperfections of nature with its volcanic eruptions, floods, typhoons, etc., are due to the activity of the substantival agents themselves who have wrongly used their great basic qualities and entered the path of egoism. God did not even create matter: matter is not a substance, but merely a process of repulsions which produce impene-

trable bulk, i.e. material corporeality, necessarily connected with manifold imperfections of nature and of human life. Nothing that has a negative value has been created by God; but everything good, everything positively valuable that is created by us, creatures, is realized with the Lord God's gracious cooperation. True science and philosophy, as well as perception guided by a pure heart, discover divine glory everywhere in the world, in accordance with the words of the prophet Isaiah: "Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God of Hosts, the heaven and earth are full of thy glory."

The above delineated theory of the structure of the world and of God's relation to it does not contradict the Orthodox dogma and is not heretical, though it differs in many respects from the traditional theological teachings. The object of the present essay is to show that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity may be combined with philosophical systems which greatly differ from one another.

THE WORD OF GOD IN THE CHURCH

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I.

THE BIBLE AND THE CHURCH TODAY

Among the many signs of potential renewal in the Church in our time, none is more significant than the increasing interest in the Bible which is becoming evident throughout the Church. The Church is being called to renewal on many fronts: a fresh approach to evangelism, an increasing emphasis on the ministry of the laity, a reawakening of the spiritual life of the Church, the reordering of parish life so that it may serve the true function of the Church, which is to proclaim the Gospel. But all of these concerns rest on a common foundation: evangelism presupposes that we know the Gospel; the ministry of the laity presupposes the existence of laymen who are grounded in the faith and articulate; the spiritual life of the Church rests upon knowledge of and obedience to our Lord; the reordering of parish life calls for knowledge of the biblical doctrine of the nature and function

of the Church. In short, each of these tasks presupposes the Bible. If the Church is to be the Church, its life must be centered in the Bible, that is, in Jesus Christ as He is revealed through the Bible.

It is true of course that the center of the life of the Church must be Christ Himself, rather than the book we call the Bible. But when we speak of Jesus Christ, we are not using an empty idea, the content of which is left for us to fill in as we wish. To know Jesus Christ is to know Him as the apostles knew Him. Only the apostles can provide us with the eye-witness testimony to what is meant when we pronounce the name of Jesus Christ. To say that Christ is the center of the life of the Church, therefore, is true, but it is insufficient in practice. The canon of Scripture became fixed in the Church in order to make it clear which Jesus Christ the Church confessed, and we must recognize this practical factor in the life of the Church.

The normative character of Scripture for the Church is written all through the Book of Common Prayer. The service of ordination to the priesthood recalls the candidate again and again to his obligation and need to ground himself and all his work on the Bible. At his ordination, every priest in the Church is required to confess: "I do believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God." The Word of *God*, that is: God's own word of judgment and mercy. This oath means clearly that every priest of the Church confesses that the Bible is the ultimate ground of his ministry and his very life, and not merely an aid to his work. It may be said, therefore, that a desire to let the Bible be the center of the life of the Church is essentially a conservative concern. Those who ask for the Bible and are beginning to try to measure their lives and the lives of their parishes by the Bible are asking for no innovation. The old seems new only if it has been forgotten.

New efforts are being made in some quarters to encourage people to read the Bible. But if the laity are left to read the Bible alone, not only do they lack the helpful discipline of a corporate action, but they are being asked to read a book that is strange to most of them. They do not understand why they should read this book above all others, nor do they know how to read it in any other way than the way in which they read other books. They cannot rely upon the prescribed discipline of Scripture reading provided by the Prayer Book's daily offices, for the discipline of daily Morning and Evening Prayer has broken down almost completely. Even those who would like to attend the daily offices have not the time to do so during the week.

These difficulties are being met to some extent by the increasing practice in some parishes of having various kinds of Bible study groups. The great advantage of this practice is that it recognizes that God's Word is addressed to his whole people. It is true of course that God's people is made up of individuals, but God speaks to us as his people, and when he speaks to us individually, he addresses us as members of the Body.

Those who have had experience with Bible groups, however, warn us of the difficulties of even this method. Fruitful Bible reading, in a group as well as alone, demands an awareness of the fact that the Bible is the witness to Jesus Christ. Without this awareness, we rarely hear the Word of God speaking into our lives with the power to make us what we cannot become by ourselves. We cannot read the Bible as we read another book.

All writing must be read with some understanding of the purpose for which it was written. If you read a poem with concern for its logical content alone, you will miss much of what the poet is trying to say. If a field officer reads the orders sent from headquarters for the sake of the style of writing, he will not be taking the message as it was meant. It would not even be right for him to confine his reading to an attempt to derive from the orders the mood and spirit of his commanding officer. He should read an order as an order, just as a poem should be read as a poem, a news report as a news report. The Bible must also be read for what it is. If it is the collected testimony of the witnesses to God's mighty acts of salvation, it must be read with eyes of faith. If it is written as God's promise, it must be read with hope. If it is really God's word of grace addressed to us, then we must read it with expectancy and with our whole being involved in what is being said to us. And if it is *God's* word, it must be read with a spirit of obedience.

But here we come to our basic difficulty. Christians are not accustomed to reading the Bible with this spirit, because they are not used to this attitude to the Bible. They may have seen the Bible treated as a useful religious or devotional book. They are flooded with pamphlets on the Church, the episcopacy, the sacraments, special books for Lent. Often the Bible is handed to them as one more in this series, rather than as the Word of God, in a class all by itself, not to be compared to other books and pamphlets. Only rarely do they see the Bible used as the canon, or standard, of everything the Church

does and says. No wonder they are confused about the Bible and do not accept its authority.

It is our contention that the success of these efforts to increase the fruitful reading of the Bible depends upon another use of the Bible: what the clergy do with the Bible in their preaching. Whatever else is done to let the Bible become more central in the life of the Church, that which we shall call "exegetical preaching" must be an indispensable part of the Church's use of the Bible, or these other efforts, however excellent they may be, will inevitably be crippled. We shall show why this is so on theological grounds, but it may also be said that the experience of some parishes seems to indicate that the use of the Bible in preaching and its use in parish groups is intimately connected, and preaching which strives to be obedient to Scripture tends to influence the way in which members of the parish approach the Bible in group discussion.

One other important, though secondary, point to be made about the kind of preaching to be defined in this essay deserves mention. There are few men who must preach regularly who are not continually worried by what they will preach about next Sunday. And when they know this, they have the further problem of finding a basis for speaking with authority. These problems of preaching are universal and difficult enough to call for no particular amplification. As we shall see, the kind of preaching to be defined here means nothing less than an end to the questions, of what to preach about, and how to speak with authority. The solution of this special problem for the clergy is not our central concern. But if we meet our basic concern for letting the Bible be the Word of God in and to the Church by exegetical preaching, we shall find that these difficult questions of the clergy are answered.

We turn now to our argument in support of the contention that the Church must have exegetical preaching as the first step in the Bible's being the Word of God in and to the Church.

II.

THE WITNESS TO REVELATION: THE BIBLE AS THE WORD OF GOD

In the beginning was the Word. The foundation of all that we are and do is God, and God has revealed himself to us in Jesus Christ. In that God spoke to mankind in Christ, the Church came into being; a new creation was begun and faith became possible. The whole of our

life as the Church of God rests on the word of his grace, spoken once for all time in Christ. The Church lives, therefore, by God's Word, which is God Himself revealing Himself to men in the covenant of Sinai, through the prophets, and finally and perfectly in Christ. There is nothing more that the Church needs to know; there is nothing more that the world needs to know. God's Word is life itself. For a world that lies in death, the Word is the resurrection and the life. There can be no question of our making the Word relevant to the world. The Word has already made itself relevant to the world: He did so when He created this world and reconciled it to Himself!

Although God revealed Himself in certain events, especially in the event of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, His Word is for all men at all times. God chose a people to bear witness to these events. He chose Israel for this work, and He chose a new Israel to take up the same work. And out of Israel, old and new, there arose men who did in obedience take up this task, pointing to the events in which God had spoken His saving Word. They proclaimed the Word of God, God's self-revelation in the world and they or their followers committed this testimony to writing. Others who came after them added their own testimony to these writings, seeing by faith other aspects of God's self-revelation. So, bit by bit, edited and reedited, there grew up the collection of writings which we call the Bible. This book contains many kinds of writings by many authors, which together form the many-sided record of God's self-revelation. Like so many witnesses in a court, each tells in his own words of what has happened. Each describes what he saw or heard from where he was standing. Together they give us a composite picture of what took place. And through their words, the event to which they point becomes present and powerful in our midst. Paul says of his preaching to the Galatians, not simply that he spoke about Christ, but that in his speaking, "Jesus Christ was publicly portrayed as crucified" (Gal. 3:1. The verb means to placard, to display as on a billboard).

The messenger who reports a message faithfully speaks the words entrusted to him. He becomes, in a sense, the voice of him who sends the message. This relationship between a messenger, his message, and the sender may help us to understand the great promise under which the Bible stands. Jesus said to His disciples when He sent them out to preach: "He who hears you hears me" (Luke 10:16). He who hears the proclamation of the disciples hears Jesus Himself. That is the promise of Christ.

Now "promise" is far from an empty hope in the Bible. Promise points to a realty which can only be seen by faith, but which faith grasps as the truth and as the substantial reality for all time. When we say that Christ is with us by His promise, we speak of a firm and substantial reality, not of a vague wish. And it is so with the promise of Christ that He will speak to us through His messengers. "Faith comes by what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ" (Rom. 10:17). Through the apostles, Christ is heard, faith becomes possible, the Church comes into being. The Church recognized that this happens only through the preaching of the apostles when it accepted the prophetic and apostolic writings as its canon or standard. The Church said and continues to say: "Through these writings, from time to time, we have heard God in Christ speaking to us. Therefore we acknowledge them to be the only reliable and obedient witness to Christ, and as such they are the Word of God."

These writings are of two kinds: the Old Testament writers point ahead to Christ ("You search the Scriptures . . . and it is they that bear witness to me," John 5:39); the New Testament writers point back to Christ ("For we did not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eye-witnesses of His majesty," II Peter 1:16). Together they form the unique record of God's Word spoken to men in Christ, a record of anticipation and a record of remembrance, united in their common object. Because the disciples were commissioned in the power of the Holy Spirit to be Christ's witnesses ("You shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you, and you shall be my witnesses . . . to the end of the earth." Acts 1:8), and because their account is trustworthy ("This is the disciple who is bearing witness to these things and who has written these things; and we know that his testimony is true," John 21:24), their words, the proclamation of the prophets and apostles of the Church, stand under the promise of Christ: "He who hears you hears me." Hearing, in this sense, is of course, the work of the Holy Spirit. There is nothing automatic, nothing that falls outside of the free operation of the Holy Spirit, when Christ is heard. But when the Spirit opens our ears, we may hear Christ Himself through His chosen messengers. Thus it is that the Bible can be the Word of God.

III.

TRUST IN THE BIBLE AS THE WORD OF GOD

It seems evident that one reason why the clergy do not preach from the Bible and under the Bible is that they have difficulty in trusting it. We were told in seminary, and many accept it in large part, that the empty tomb, for example, was probably not "historical." The same holds true for many of the miracles, especially those which do not lend themselves readily to psychological interpretation. When these reports are placed before us, we shy away, not only in our preaching, but inevitably in our whole attitude toward the Bible. In a word, we find it difficult to trust the Bible as the Word of God. The situation presented by the critical investigation of Scripture must be faced.

Consider the Gospels for example. The form critics tell us that they are collections from the preaching of the early Church, and if, in our concern for the historical, we begin to try to separate what Jesus actually said from the preaching of the first disciples, we find ourselves lost. Scholars disagree among themselves. All we can say with certainty about many a passage is that it is the proclamation of the disciples. They preached a Jesus who did and said certain things. Behind their preaching, the disciples claim, stands the event of the birth, life, death, and resurrection of this man. But we cannot go behind their preaching. Behind it lie only dim outlines and uncertainty. This uncertainty seems even to have been the intention of the first disciples. They seem to have had no interest in preserving any other record than that of the Jesus in whom they believed. We find ourselves in the position of a jury at a trial. Either we accept the composite witness of those who were there at the event in question, or we do not. If we do not, then we have little hope of seeing that event. The quest for the "historical Jesus" has proved to be ultimately fruitless. But if we do trust their report, then we must accept the event as they saw it, or as they had received it from other eye-witnesses who were no longer present. We must compare the evidence of one with that of another, but we are limited to the evidence that lies before us in the apostolic preaching. This is the "either/or" decision of the Canon, a decision implied again and again by the ecumenical councils of the early Church, and repeated in the Book of Common Prayer. This is the decision demanded of every priest at his ordination, when he is asked to read and sign the oath: "I do believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God." This decision

means that the Church accepts the preaching of the prophets and apostles as authentic and binding. We do not say that their actual words are to be identified with God's own Word. But we do say that their words bear faithful witness to God's own Word, and that we shall hear God's Word only through their words. We are indebted to the form critics and to the whole development which made form criticism possible for having shown us that the New Testament is made up of a series of fragments drawn from the proclamation of the early Church. From these fragments we can see what was the concern of the first disciples and what they conceived their task to be. Their concern and task were to be witnesses to Jesus Christ.

In the face of destructive criticism of the biblical writings, therefore, we may grant the conclusion of the form critics: the only witness to God's self-revelation comes to us in the form of the preaching of the apostles and prophets. But St. Paul assures us that we are "fellow-citizens with the saints and members of the household of God," which is "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus Himself being the chief cornerstone" (Eph. 2:19-20). We accept their record as faithful and obedient. Through their words we must try to see and hear the One whom they proclaim. This means that we must hear all of the biblical message. How can we hear the testimony of the early Church, if we do not hear what they have to say, for example, about an empty tomb on Easter morning? That is certainly part of their message, and if we reject that, then we are distorting what they want us to hear. We shall not be hearing what God's chosen messengers were commissioned to say to us. (Matthias was chosen to "become with us a witness to his resurrection," Acts 1:22). We must hear the whole of their message if we hope to hear the One to whom they point. Until we think through this matter of criticism and the Bible, and until we learn to go beyond critical analysis of the Bible to a firm trust in the Bible as the faithful witness to the living Lord, the Bible will not become the living Word of God for us, or, so far as the preaching of the Church is concerned, for our people. (An excellent example of this kind of post-critical trust in the Bible as the Word of God is the commentary on *The Fourth Gospel* by E. C. Hoskyns.)

IV.

PREACHING AS THE WORD OF GOD

He who hears the word of Christ knows that he is under obligation to

take up that word and bear it farther. The Gospel is not a talent to be buried in a napkin. The task of the Church, therefore, is to proclaim to each generation the One whom it has heard through the words of the apostles and prophets. One of the primary ways in which the Church fulfills this task is by the preaching of its ministers. There are other forms of proclamation (the preaching of laymen, personal conversation between Christians and unbelievers, writings by Christians) but we may take the Sunday sermon in its character of human words spoken in obedience to God's Word as a type of the various ways in which the Church carries out its commission to preach the Gospel.

In a sermon, a man stands up before the Church and proclaims Christ. He has heard Christ speak through the biblical record. He has heard Christ in hearing His disciples. Their words became His Word. Now he in turn takes up their message. When he does so, we say in the language of the Prayer Book that he preaches "the Word of God." By what right may we say that the Sunday sermon is the Word of God? To answer this, we must go back to the promise under which the Bible can become the Word of God. We found that the disciples could be the voice of Christ and the Bible could be the Word of God because the disciples and the authors of the Bible preached Christ obediently. When we take up their testimony, we do so in a secondary way. We are not eye-witnesses as they were. We can only take up what they say and be as obedient to it as possible. But if we do that, we too may stand with them under the promise of Christ, and we may carry on the work of the apostles. Our words, if they are obedient to their words, may share in the promise that he who hears us will hear Christ Himself. The Word of God, Jesus Christ Himself, will be present and at work through our words. He who hears us will hear Him, and our words of a Sunday morning will become the life-giving Word of God.

But this can be true only when our preaching is obedient to the witness of the Bible. We share in the apostolic authority only when we submit to its authority over us. If we preach on religious topics, if we hold edifying discourses on morals, even if we give challenging addresses on the social problems of the day, we cannot expect that those who hear us will hear anyone else but ourselves. "Let the prophet who has a dream tell the dream, but let him who has my word speak my word faithfully" (Jer. 23:28). There is no promise, no commission, and no authority for any other preaching than for that preaching which is obedient to the words of the Bible. Only preaching under the

Bible can become the means by which Christ is present among us to speak His Word of eternal life to us. Only when we preach in obedience to the Bible can we dare to speak of a doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the sacrament of preaching. But when we do preach in this way, then we must believe in the real presence of Christ in preaching, according to His promise. It was with the commission to preach that Christ promised that He would be with His Church. "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations . . . baptizing them . . . and teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, to the end of the age" (Matt. 28:20).

V.

EXEGETICAL PREACHING

Most of us remember our first lectures in homiletics in seminary, when we were told that there were many kinds of sermons: the topical sermon, the instructional and doctrinal sermon, the "old-fashioned exegetical sermon." But these different kinds of "sermons" are not in the same class. They do not all rest under the promise of Christ, and they do not all carry an authority other than that of men. There is only one kind of sermon that rests under the promise of Christ and carries his authority: the exegetical sermon. The others are various forms of religious talks. There is reason for this statement, for if we listen to any real preaching from the Bible, we notice that it is generally exegetical. The preaching of Luther and Calvin was of this sort, and whether we like or dislike the results, we must admit that their preaching had power and carried authority. It might be theoretically true that in time a man might become so grounded in Scripture, so well versed in the thought of the Bible, that he could drop exegetical preaching and preach on lines of thought that run through the Bible. But it is significant that Luther, who translated the Bible, and Calvin, who wrote commentaries on almost every book of the Bible, never felt free to do this. They felt that they had to stay with the text in preaching, and it is doubtful if we can conform our thoughts to the Word of God to such an extent that we may speak apart from the words of the Bible and still say what the Bible is saying. If we wish to be obedient to the Bible, we must stay with the words of the Bible.

Yet preaching under the Bible cannot be a simple repetition of the words of the Bible. The words require translation, both into the lan-

guage and into the situation of our day. The translation is done for us, in part, by those who have given us the English Bibles. We can always learn more by reading the original, but in general, we may say that we have already, at least in the Revised Standard Version, a good translation in our own tongue. The next step is to translate what we read there into words that strike into our situation today. If the Bible is the living Word of God, then it must live among us, in the midst of our lives, speaking to us where we are.

Most of us today are preoccupied with the situation to which we speak. But we can never be as concrete as the Word of God. It speaks to particular men in particular circumstances. Moreover, the Word of God defines the situation to which it speaks, just as Christ Himself defined every situation where He was present in His life on earth. If we will drop our preoccupation with our situation long enough to become preoccupied with the Word of God as it is addressed to us concretely, we shall find that the Bible drives us back to face our situation at the deepest level. It is absurd for us to worry as we do about "making the Bible relevant." The Word of God is far more relevant than we could ever be, and if we will be obedient to the Bible, truly obedient, then we shall find ourselves far more deeply involved in the lives of our people and in the "situation" than we ever were when we were anxious to be "relevant." God's Word is devastatingly relevant when it is truly preached and truly heard. "So shall my word be that goes forth out of my mouth, it shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose, and prosper in the thing for which I sent it." (Isa. 5:11). "Is not my word like fire, says the Lord, and like a hammer which breaks the rock in pieces?" (Jer 23:29). The Word of God has directness, particularity, concreteness. This must be evident in the way in which we expound the text. The sermon should be, in a sense, an extension of the Bible into our own times. It can never be an extension in the sense of being an addition to the canon. When our preaching is not truly obedient, but adds something to Scripture, it is no longer the Word of God, but merely the word of man, lacking authority and probably not very relevant. In order that the Bible may extend into our lives, preaching must remain under the Bible so that God's Word speaks with power into the lives of our people.

VI.

A METHOD FOR EXEGETICAL PREACHING

In exegetical preaching, we try to stand quite consciously *under* the Bible, not on the same level. In order to make what this means quite clear, we shall outline a method for exegetical preaching, as a guide to indicate more explicitly what has been said, not in any sense as "rules" to be followed slavishly.

1. *Prayer.* The first prerequisite for exegetical preaching is prayer. The New Testament can be analyzed without prayer, as can any book. But prayer is essential in the exegesis of the Bible as the living witness to the living Lord. We must begin our weekly preparation for exegetical preaching with prayer that Christ will send His Spirit to open our ears, so that we may hear Him speak to His Church today through the words of His disciples. The more we work at this sort of preaching, the more we shall see the necessity for prayer throughout our work on the sermon, for we shall find again and again that we seem to be beating against a stone wall with our bare fists. We can understand the words of the text, but we see no farther than the words and we do not hear Christ Himself. And in the agony of this situation, we can only pray, and we must pray. For we must expound the Word of God, on which alone the Church can thrive.

2. *A long text.* After prayer comes the selection of a text. There are two guides in choosing a text, which we learn from those who have gone before us in the faith and have left us their examples of exegetical preaching. First, we should not confine ourselves to a verse or two, but take a passage of from five to ten verses. The passages assigned in the propers or the lessons for the daily offices are of a suitable length. The reason for choosing a long text is a practical one: if we preach for twenty minutes on one verse, we have a thousand opportunities to use the text as a springboard, from which we may take a graceful dive into the deep. If we preach for twenty minutes or so on the Gospel for the day, we must move with the text and stay with it in order to stay within a reasonable limit. We cannot impose on the sermon any three points we might want to make. The text itself will often give us the order and structure of what we say, as well as the content.

There are single verses in the Bible which call for considerable exposition, but there is a danger here. If we expound one verse for twenty minutes, what is to hold our exposition true to the Bible? What is to prevent our exposition from being simply the human interpreta-

tion of some theology that is popular at the moment? Practically, we should recognize the need to submit to the discipline of a longer text.

This simply external discipline of a long enough text will help us right from the beginning to keep to a careful and full exposition, for we shall not have time to wander off into ideas of our own, however "biblical" we may think them to be. We shall be forced to submit to the Word as it stands written in our text. A short, one-verse text would leave us free to do what we wanted and free from the submission necessary for the preaching which stands under the promise of the real presence of Christ.

3. *An assigned text.* Secondly, we should let the text be assigned to us. We may take a text assigned by the lectionary or the propers, or we may follow successive passages in one book of the Bible. We could preach, for example, on the Gospel for each Sunday for a whole year. We are then forced to follow the Word, even when we want to say something else. If we pick our own text each week, we shall find that we lean too much on one author or one side of the biblical witness. But more important still: if we are free to pick our text, we may start with one passage, see nothing in it, and turn to another. This may not open for us either, and so we turn to yet another. Aside from the waste of time, we shall find ourselves paying the price of never learning how to wrestle with the Word. This is terribly important: we shall not suffer Jacob's limp, but we shall not know his blessing either. In order to grow in this kind of preaching, we must know the experience of being driven in desperation to our knees as we try to hear God speak to us in the passage before us. If we stick to a lectionary, then we are forced each week to expound the passage assigned, and the time otherwise spent in hunting for a more "transparent" passage (and we soon run out of "transparent" passages) will be spent in wrestling on our knees for a glimpse of Christ through the words of the Bible. In this way we grow in submitting ourselves to the Word, and so grow as preachers and servants of the Word of God. It is also helpful for the congregations when their minister preaches on one of the lections, in that it gives unity and consistency to the service. The passage of Scripture read in the service is expounded in the sermon, instead of being left dangling in the air.

4. *Exegetical aids.* Next begins the work of exegesis itself. It is best to begin the preparation of a sermon by reading the text over, praying over it, and then turning to one or more commentaries, lexicons, or concordances. But finally we must close all our books and go back

and wrestle with the text alone. One cannot preach from commentaries. There is no such thing as a "second-hand" Word of God. Commentaries may be helpful, but we must always remember that they can only help us understand the text. They cannot replace our own wrestling with the text as we try to hear God speaking to us where we stand.

5. *Time.* Ultimately, we are on our own in exegeting the Bible. We are alone on our knees, waiting upon God, confronted by the words of the witness to Christ. And we must work there alone until we see and hear the One to whom the words bear witness, until He speaks to us. Exegetical preaching is not an easy and quick business. This is no job to leave until Saturday evening. In general, the preparation, writing, and practice-delivery of such a sermon will take from six to ten hours. Sometimes it will come in less than six hours, sometimes it will take twice that. But in general, we must give one full day of hard, though stimulating, work to our preaching. Surely we have time, surely we can take this time, in order that the people we serve may have the fruit of the promise, that they may hear the words of their Lord and have life. "Blessed . . . are those who hear the Word of God and keep it" (Luke 11:23). "I do not pray for these only, but also for those who are to believe in me through their word" (John 17:2). This is what we are here for: that our people may abide in Christ and that He may be with them in Word and Sacrament. For this there must be time.

6. *Exposition and application.* The proper relationship between exposition and application is neither easy to define nor simple to achieve. Exegetical preaching demands them both, because the Word of God demands them both. God's Word demands that we understand clearly *what* is being said to us, and it demands that we hear it as being said *to us* in the situation in which we stand. The fundamental and primary step must be to hear *what* is being said to us. But because God's Word of judgment and mercy is addressed to us directly where we are, the application of what the Bible says must also become clear, so that we hear it being said *to us*. The hardest part of exegetical preaching is to hold these two elements together. Exposition and application should properly go together, so that they move hand in hand along with the movement of the text. Ideally, they should be one and the same thing, for from God's side there is no distinction between what He has to say and its application to us, but this is a goal we seldom achieve.

In practice, we find ourselves too much on the side of exposition for a while, and then, seeking to correct this, we overemphasize the side of application. Probably most of us are subject more often to the

second tendency. But we need have no fear that greater obedience and closer attention to the exposition of the text will take us away from the "situation." On the contrary, what God says to us is all that really matters, and the more we submit to His Word, the better we shall see our situation and be able to speak to it, not in our own halting words, but in the power of God's almighty Word.

VII.

EXEGETICAL PREACHING AND THE BIBLE IN THE CHURCH

Exegetical preaching is a concrete way in which we may take up the witness of the apostles and prophets to their Lord and ours. It means preaching under the promise that Christ will be present and will be heard through us. It means preaching with authority, humility and thanksgiving: authority, because, by submitting ourselves to the Word, the authority of what we say is God's, not man's; humility, because of the greatness and the goodness of the promise under which we, as unworthy servants of Christ, are permitted to proclaim Him; thanksgiving, because the promise of Luke 10:16 is the promise of our Lord to be present in the proclamation of the Church.

Exegetical preaching can be also a witness of another kind. It can be a witness to our people of the authority of the Bible, in that we let them see their priests placing themselves under the Bible and deriving their authority from their obedience. As men under authority, the clergy will have real authority. It can become a clear indication to our people that "the Word of God is not bound" (II Tim. 2:9), but that it is alive and "runs swiftly" (Ps. 147:15). We must help our people see that the Bible is not a dead book but the living Word of God.

Exegetical preaching can help laymen to trust the Bible as they did in past generations. Seeing their priests trusting it and preaching from it and learning from it, they will come to trust in it too as the one faithful witness to Christ. They will begin to learn what it means to open the Bible and to let it speak as it wants to speak into their lives. Exegetical preaching is not the only means, but it is certainly an indispensable means of letting the Bible be the Word of God in the language of the people, the Word of God that gives life to the Church.

NOTES, COMMENTS AND PROBLEMS

REMINISCENCES OF R. H. CHARLES

When R. H. Charles was at Trinity College, Dublin, as a divinity student, he was nominated as auditor of the Theological Debating Society. At the time he was much influenced by Farrar's book *Eternal Hope* and before the election declared his views to the Society, thinking that they should know that he was heterodox on the subject of hell. The problem pursued him through his life: one of his first books was *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, in Judaism and in Christianity*. It was rumored that later on in the Faculty Common room at T.C.D., his nickname was 'Sheol' because of his peculiar interest in that mysterious place.

Dr. Charles began his ministry in Whitechapel, London, in 1883. He told us once at one of the gatherings which he sometimes had in his rooms that on his first round of visits, half the doors in his district were slammed in his face; on his next round only one door was shut to him and that was the door of a brothel. In another London parish, St. Mark's, Kennington, he became unusually popular in a rather curious way. He dismissed from the Sunday school for unruly conduct, the two sons of a leading and wealthy parishioner, boys who belonged to the often unpleasant, over-privileged class. The parents of the other children realized that he meant to have a *real* school and that he was one 'who regarded not the position of men' and they gave him enthusiastic support.

Five years of parish work in London was too much for his health and he went for rest to Germany. He once told us that up to that time he had felt that philosophy was his special subject but he now turned his attention to the intertestamental period. The importance of the Book of Enoch at once became apparent to him and he studied Dillmann's edition with extreme care. After Germany he studied at Oxford and in addition to the study of apocalyptic took up wood carving as a hobby. This proved a complete cure for constant acute headaches to which he was liable. One of his closest friends at Oxford was Dr. Cheyne, though Dr. Charles never accompanied Cheyne into the wilderness of 'Jerahmeel.'

While Dr. Charles was at Oxford, he was lent to T.C.D. as Professor

of Biblical Greek and for several years came over to his native Ireland for part of the year. I attended his lectures on the Book of Daniel and suspect that he was trying out on us his notes for his edition of that book. The lectures at any rate were not thrilling, but when he took us to his rooms and let himself go on his favorite subjects, we really learned something or better still we realized that we had a lot to learn.

In 1913 Dr. Charles, much to his own surprise, was appointed a Canon of Westminster. As usual he took his preaching work very seriously, so seriously indeed that he almost emptied the Abbey with his first course of sermons. He mistook the Abbey congregation for a group of students whose passion in life was to learn more about Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. We know just what the sermons were like for they are the chapters in his excellent book, *Religious Development between the Old and New Testament*. Warned by this failure, he revised his methods and hence forth preached effectively on problems of the twentieth century A.D. and no longer on those of the second century B.C. In 1919 he was appointed Archdeacon of Westminster and made his own the problems of the poor who lived in the neighborhood of the Abbey. Conscientiousness in his work, whatever it might be, was his most marked characteristic. I remember his telling us once that in six weeks he had to preach in the College Chapel at Dublin. He had chosen his text John 7:17 and was planning the sermon but he added, "It may not be quite ready in time and I may have to preach an old sermon." Dr. Charles was a pioneer in regions hitherto unexplored, like his older colleague at Dublin and my tutor for a brief period, Dr. Mahaffy. At that time Dr. Mahaffy was a lonely pioneer in the study of the Hellenistic age. In the case of both of these men, some of their work has failed to stand the test of later criticism but all pioneers must occasionally go down false trails and they both opened up new tracks for Hebrew and Ethiopic and Greek research.

A. HAIRE FORSTER

In one of his mournful elegies Mimnermus has the phrase *pēchuiion epi chronon*, meaning for a "cubit of time," that is, for a brief period. This is strong support for taking *hēlikian* in Matt. 6:27 as referring to age, not height. In Plutarch's *Moralia* the word *hēlikia* occurs quite often and in every case noted, it means age, never height. A.H.F.

Scholars interested in the Eastern Churches who are planning to visit Greece for study and consultation with the Theological Faculty of the University of Athens will be welcome to use the excellent facilities of the Gennadius Library of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, and to make this their scholarly headquarters while in Athens. The library has a rich and famous collection of material in the history of Orthodox Christianity, theology, patristics, liturgy and Christian archaeology and geography, as well as in the larger fields of the history, literature and civilization of mediaeval and modern Greece and the Near East, including the Byzantine, Frankish and Turkish periods. All qualified scholars are invited to use the library for study and research. The librarian's address is: Dr. Peter Topping, Gennadius Library, Athens 40, Greece.

GLANVILLE DOWNEY

LITERATURE ON SPACE CHRISTOLOGY

When I wrote my paper, "Do We Need a Space Christology?", published in this REVIEW, April, 1957, I thought there was virtually no literature on the subject, except W. Norman Pittenger's popular article, "Christianity and the Man on Mars," which appeared in *The Christian Century* for June 20, 1956, and imaginative writings, such as science fiction, some English poems, including T. S. Eliot's "The Dry Salvages" and Alice Meynell's "Christ in the Universe," and works of 17th century French writers, particularly those of Pascal and Cyrano de Bergerac, the French material being significant in its early recognition of the spiritual meaning of the plurality of worlds. References to space christology in science fiction, poetic or otherwise, are important in that they indicate that the problem is *real* to the human mind. They suggest too that it may be more real to the creative lay mind than to the professional theologian. The latter have a tendency to awaken late. My notion that there was little literature on the subject was based on the fact that I had noticed little or nothing but it was strengthened by the further fact that some distinguished theologians at home and abroad had written me that they also had seen little or nothing. One wrote, "I have been following theological writing both Catholic and Protestant quite closely for the past fifteen years, and I do not recall any serious Catholic study of the problems which the inhabitation of other planets would raise for Christian revelation."

Since writing my article, however, I have discovered that there was not only literature in the field but that it is increasing rather rapidly.

The bibliography I have to date is as follows: *Periodical*: E. L. Mascall, "Is the Incarnation Unique?", *Theology*, August, 1953, p. 288 ff. (Anglican theology); Vernon Grounds, "If Man Ever Reaches Mars," *Eternity*, November, 1956 (fundamentalist); Gary Webster, "Life on Mars? Well—", *Natural History*, December, 1956 (scientific); Harlow Shapley, "Man's Fourth Adjustment," *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, January 19, 1957 (scientific); James M. Guthrie, "The Man from Outer Space," *Christianity Today*, April 29, 1957 (fundamentalist); Daniel Lang, "A Reporter at Large—Earth Satellite No. 1", *The New Yorker*, May 11, 1957 (scientific). *Books*: Arthur F. Smethurst, *Modern Science and Christian Beliefs*, Abingdon Press, 1955 (Anglican); Wolfgang D. Müller, *Man Among the Stars*, Criterion Books, 1957 (Chapter 13, "Religion in Space," in Müller's book is useful, because it gives references to books and periodicals in various languages, including a book written more than fifty years ago by the Roman Catholic theologian, Josef Pohle, entitled, *Die Sternenwelten und ihre Bewohner*). E. L. Mascall's article noted above refers to a book by E. A. Milne entitled, *Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of God*, p. 153. Mascall's article and his book, *Christian Theology and Natural Science: Some Questions on Their Relations*, Ronald Press, 1956, constitute the most thoroughgoing Anglican treatment of space christology, holding for the possibility and theological reasonableness of repeated Incarnations of the Christ in the stellar universe.

To the best of my knowledge at present, the first treatment of space christology in a work labeling itself systematic theology is in *Existence and the Christ*, Volume II of Paul Tillich's *Systematic Theology*, University of Chicago Press, 1957. Dr. Tillich holds that "the interdependence of everything with everything else in the totality of being includes a participation of nature in history and demands a participation of the universe in salvation" (p. 96). That is undeniable, I think. He seems also to hold (his language in this regard is not absolutely clear to me, in spite of the fact that he has at last achieved a clear simple English style) that the Incarnation as we know it was for "historical man alone". At any rate what Tillich writes on any subject must be read in the light of the *total context* of his philosophical theology.

The Rev. Ralph Tapia, S.T.D. (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome) of St. John's Cathedral, Fresno, California, is working on the problem from a Roman Catholic standpoint. Henri de Lubac, S.J., in *The Splendour of the Church*, Sheed and Ward, 1956, agrees with St.

Thomas that we can give the name "Church" to the "gigantic organism" which includes the angels as well as men and extends to the cosmos (p. 29). *Is it possible that the holy Catholic Church of the historic creeds includes all sentient beings in the whole of reality?* Another big question! A Roman Catholic bishop, the Most Rev. Harry A. Clinch, D.D., of Monterey-Fresno, has told me unofficially in conversation as a friend that his practical solution of the planetary problem is either that God has not revealed himself on the subject or that the doctrine has not yet become *explicit* in Christian thought, through the conjunction of time, thought, scientific research, and revelation. (John Henry Newman's great book, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, may prove invaluable in the development of space christology for the whole Christian world.)

The biblical commentaries have long noted that such passages as Phil. 2:9-11 and Col. 1:20 indicate the cosmic effect of Christ's death, i.e. its relation to angels, spirits unknown to mankind, and the natural universe itself. Theologians will take more specific notice of such passages from now on.

JAMES M. MALLOCH

BOOK REVIEWS

A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. A translation and adaptation of Walter Bauer's Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur, fourth revised and augmented edition, 1952. By William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Cambridge University Press, 1957, pp. xxxvii + 909. \$14.00.

The editors point out in the Foreword that they have not attempted to make a literal translation of Bauer, though their departures from the general sense of Bauer's work are rare. Significant adaptations or additions to the treatment of a number of words have been made (a representative list of such being given on p. vi), and some words are included that are not in Bauer's work, most of them either from the fragments of Papias or from the apparatus of the latest editions of the Nestle text. References are made to the works of Moulton-Milligan, Buck, Goodspeed and Field to compensate for the paucity of etymological information. The bibliographical references have been amplified,

particularly in the citation of periodical literature down to the latter part of 1954.

Following the Foreword the reader will find a translation of Bauer's article, *An Introduction to the Lexicon of the Greek New Testament*, printed as No. XV of "Coniectanea Neotestamentica." It includes an analysis of the Koine, vocabulary, grammatical structure and use of words, and a discussion of the influence of the LXX, of Latin, Hebrew and Aramaic, and of the drawing together of Judaism and Hellenism. It concludes with the discussion of a number of words and phrases which, due to the last named factor, are of uncertain interpretation.

A word of praise should be said for the editors, for their arrangement of the entries, and for the printers. This lexicon is easier to read than any of comparable scope I have used. The words at the head of each entry are printed in heavy black type and set *out* two spaces into the margin (in contrast to Thayer, for example, in which they are *indented* two spaces); the numbers and letters used to mark of sections of the entry are also bold face, and are all found on the left margin of the column rather than buried in the body of the paragraph; there is a generous margin between the two columns on the page; there is sufficient space between lines to make even the reading of a series of letters and numbers easy; and the type face can be read at arm's length. The Greek type face, by the way, is the German style used in Nestle, but it sits up straight instead of being slightly slanted and seems to me on that account much easier to read especially in a work like this where it stands next to vertical English face.

Thayer is perhaps the most widely used lexicon of comparable size. A random comparison indicates that the arrangement within the entries is much superior, and the documentation more to the point. Then of course much more material is now available for the lexicographer, some of which is not even in the fourth German edition of Bauer. *Epiousios* is a good example. The word is used but once in the New Testament, that being in the Lord's Prayer (also in *Didache 8:2*), where the RSV gives *daily bread* in the text and *bread for tomorrow* in the margin. The word has been a puzzle from the beginning. Origen thought the Evangelists had coined it, and his opinion was accepted until recently. Now one and possibly a second instance have been found in secular Greek literature. Arndt-Gingrich list four main interpretations adopted by modern scholars, giving a full bibliography for each. (1) necessary for existence (deriving it from *epi* and *ousia*). (2) for today. (3) for the following day. Here belongs the second

possible occurrence in secular literature, an inscription of disputed reading referred to in the present work under *sēmeron* and discussed in *Museon Helveticum*, VI (1949), 216 f., 9, IX (1952), 60-62. (4) for the future, with the variants 'that comes to' the day, 'next', and the day of the 'coming' Kingdom. (Incidentally, *Museon Helveticum* is referred to as Mus. Helvet. in the text, but that abbreviation is not included among those given at the beginning of the volume). The treatment of the term in Thayer is about the same length, but the secular usage(s) were unknown, and the types of interpretation are not so clearly classified.

Superiority in arrangement and clarity is illustrated in another way by *antitypos*. Here Thayer begins (as commonly) with the etymological derivation, giving as meanings, "repelling a blow . . .; struck back . . .; harsh." Then the meanings in the New Testament are given, but it is necessary to look under *typos* to complete ones data and even then the relation of the former term to the latter is not completely explained. Here is the first paragraph of the entry in Arndt-Gingrich: "I. adj. corresponding to someth. that has gone before. The à. is usually regarded as secondary to the *typos* (cf. Ex. 25:40), but since *typos* can mean both 'original' and 'copy' (see s.v. 2 and 5), à. is also ambiguous (Polyb. 6, 31, 8 *antitypos tithemai tini* I am placed opposite someth.). Thus in 1 Pt. 3:21 *ho* (i.e. *hydōr*) *humas a. nyn sōzei baptismma* means *baptism, which is a fulfilment (of the type) now saves you*, i.e., the saving of Noah fr. the flood is a *typos*, or 'foreshadowing' (hardly the 'original in the full Platonic sense 2 below'), and baptism corresponds to it (so PLundberg, *La Typologie Baptismale dans l'ancienne Eglise*, '42, 110ff; EGSelwyn, *The First Epistle of St Peter*, '46, 298f; diffl., BREICKE, *The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism*, '46, 144f.)".

In the instance just quoted references were given to three books: references to periodical literature are also a prominent feature, and the number of references increases in the case of words difficult of interpretation. In the case of *epiousios*, for example, citations are given for twenty-six books and forty articles or series of articles (in addition to standard commentaries and dictionaries); in the case of the Pauline phrase, *hē ek theou dikaiosynē*, fifteen books and thirteen articles are cited in addition to the citations under the other uses of *dikaiosynē*.

In addition to the authors and publishers of this volume, our warm-

est thanks are due to the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. The decision of that church to set aside part of the 1947 centennial thank-offering as a fund for scholarly research enabled Dr. Gingrich to devote full time to the project and made its publication possible.

HOLT GRAHAM

The Background of the New Testament and Its Eschatology. Edited by W. D. Davies and D. Daube. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956, pp. xviii + 555. \$13.50.

This book, edited and written in honor of Professor C. H. Dodd, fulfills its purpose in every way. An international group of twenty-six scholars has contributed essays whose quality and significance speak for themselves. As the title shows, the book is planned to encompass studies in the major areas of Dodd's researches. The editors have included essays which not only represent significant new contributions to these areas, but at point after point show their indebtedness to Dodd's previous work. The reviewer cannot mention each essay by title. However, some indication of the content of each will suggest the scope, significance and relevance of the book.

An important contribution to the lively subject of biblical hermeneutics is made by E. C. Blackman. After an analysis of the contemporary problems confronting the exegete, he defines his task in the present situation. Two thorough and illuminating studies, bringing the reader up to date in the complex fields of the textual criticism of the New Testament and Septuagintal studies, are written by K. W. Clark and P. Katz, respectively.

In the area of Christian origins, a contribution to the hotly debated subject of the relation of Christianity to Gnosticism is the well-balanced essay of R. P. Casey in which he carefully discusses the meaning and content of "knowledge" throughout the New Testament. F. C. Grant, in an informative analysis of the economic situation in the first century Roman empire, further demonstrates the inadequacy of economic determinism as the explanation for the origin and success of the Christian church. Against the background of the new consideration of the significance of the Essene movement for Christian origins prompted by the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, M. Black studies anew the passages dealing with the Essenes in Hippolytus and Josephus.

Several essays deal specifically with the Gospels. W. D. Davies, in a thorough review and appraisal of Carrington's *The Primitive Chris-*

tian Calendar, discusses the strength and weaknesses of the latter's argument for liturgical influence on the development of the Gospels. G. Bornkamm gives a brilliant analysis of the eschatology and ecclesiology (and their interrelation) of the Gospel of Matthew and the decisive influence of both on the form and content of this Gospel. A. Feuillet finds in Matthew, Chapter 24, a concept of the *parousia* distinctive from its normative use in the New Testament (with the exception of James), finding its fulfilment in a historic judgment on the unbelief of the Jews (destruction of the Temple?). Two essays are devoted to the Fourth Gospel: W. F. Albright examines the similarities between the religious thought and terminology of the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Gospel of John; E. Stauffer finds in the Fourth Gospel a reaction against tendencies toward an excessive apocalyptic view of messiahship in the early church; and in the light of the Jewish view of the Messiah *absconditus* and *incognitus* he suggests the author's view may be nearer that of the historic Jesus than that represented in the Synoptics.

T. W. Manson's essay on the present situation in studies of the life of Jesus reflects the developing reaction to the scepticism of some form-critics and the new critical re-appraisal of the historical reliability of the Synoptic Gospels. This same reaction informs H. Riesenfeld's effort to provide a background for the study of New Testament Christology—a study which he unequivocally affirms must presuppose Jesus' own messianic consciousness. H.-J. Schoeps adds to his numerous studies of Jewish Christianity a highly significant study of Ebionite Christology and its influence on the Ebionites interpretation of law and history.

Two highly suggestive studies in Pauline theology are contributed by H. Clavier and M. Goguel. The former considers Paul's concept of "spiritual body" against the background of hellenistic dualism and eschatological dualism. Clavier urges recognition of Paul's polemical use of the concept and argues that the problem he faced might have been as much an animistic view of Sheol-Hades, common to Jews and Greeks, as popularized Platonic idealism. M. Goguel argues that Paul's view of salvation must be understood in light of his transformation of the Jewish eschatological categories of the old and new world through a third category—the time between the resurrection and *parousia* of Christ.

Three essays deal with later New Testament Epistles. C. K. Barrett persuasively defends the thesis that much of the so-called popularized Platonic dualism found in the Epistle to the Hebrews must be

understood in the light of Jewish eschatological dualism. The same problem, the relation of biblical eschatology and Platonic idealism, though treated within a larger context than the Epistle to the Hebrews (Philo, Origen, etc.), is the subject of an essay by J. Héring. E. G. Selwyn finds that I Peter, from the standpoint of eschatology, represents the central tradition of the New Testament—"for the most part eschatology fulfilled."

There are a number of essays dealing with more general problems. N. A. Dahl makes a notable contribution to an important, but neglected topic, the implications of Christology and Ecclesiology for a New Testament doctrine of Creation. O. Cullman examines the New Testament basis for missions in the light of the new insights derived from the new understanding of New Testament eschatology. C. F. D. Moule provides a fresh interpretation of the neglected motif of judgment as it relates to the Sacraments. Against the background of the Old Testament, Iranian religion, late Judaism, and gnosticism, E. Schweizer discusses the New Testament concept of Spirit, especially as it relates to Christian hope. A. N. Wilder, continuing his research into the relation of eschatology and ethics, argues that on the basis of the proper understanding of the *kerygma* and eschatology in the New Testament Christian action inevitably leads into the socio-political sphere of decision and conflict.

There are at least two essays which, though appreciative, are more critical than the others of the well-known theses of Dodd. H. J. Cadbury argues that Dodd has oversimplified the problem of reconstructing a normative *kerygma* of the early church. From the beginning there were varying versions, whose variations were quite significant. R. Bultmann, in a study of Dodd's *The Bible Today*, raises a question regarding Dodd's understanding of the relation of revelation and history. He asks what philosophical presuppositions undergird Dodd's theology, implying, as others have before, that an idealistic immanentalism is a decisive influence in Dodd's historical reconstruction and theological interpretation.

These brief and obviously inadequate summarizing statements suggest the scope and direction of the essays. Two impressions of the reviewer are noteworthy. First, most of the major problems confronting New Testament scholars today in one way or another come into focus in the essays. Second, the broad influence of the work of Dodd on contemporary New Testament studies is vividly, though in-

directly, attested. All who labor in these fields will be grateful to the editors not only for the contribution of this book to increased knowledge, but for the public tribute it accords C. H. Dodd. The reviewer's only regret is that there are ten essays in German and French which will not be accessible to many who would appreciate them.

FRANKLIN W. YOUNG

Christology and Myth in the New Testament. By Geraint Vaughan Jones. New York: Harper, 1956. pp. 289. \$4.50.

The sub-title of this work reads, "An inquiry into the character, extent and interpretation of the mythological element in New Testament Christology." This rather modestly describes the extent to which the problem has been probed since the related matters of pre-existence, creation, evil and archetypal norms came in for careful attention. In the discussion of "demythologizing" this offers a valuable guide and critical examination going behind the application of any particular existentialist philosophy. The essential point is the relevance of the New Testament Christology for today—or tomorrow.

The preface includes a useful summary of titles of the relevant literature and there are two appendices and three indexes (names, subjects and foreign terms—a Biblical index is lacking). The body of the book is divided into four Parts. "Prolegomena" deals with the genesis and nature of the discussion and with the terminology involved, particularly in the form in which Bultmann has given it currency. Part Two deals with the problem of the mythological presentation of New Testament Christology both in its substance (the key passages are helpfully printed in full) and its interpretation. Part Three, "Kyrios Christos," deals with the Lordship of Christ in relation particularly with creation and the problem of evil. Eschatology is not attempted except in relation to the myth of cosmic redemption. The last part distinguishes between myth and mythological thinking and offers a summary of the position in presenting the myth as archetype and norm. There are somewhat helpful summaries of the argument preceding each part.

The basic points of view are that mythological thinking is at a minimum in the Synoptics, that the New Testament center of interest is not cosmological but historical and existential, that there is mythological thinking rather than myth in the strict sense and that some form of mythological expression is necessary if the kerygmatic gospel

is to have an enduring core and not be lost in a passing mode of thought. The basic issue is expressed as follows (p. 249): "What we encounter is really the problem of language as symbol and of what kind of symbol is to be considered adequate to the communication of religious belief." The author holds (p. 241) mythological thinking to "be an indispensable mode of religious perception." There are points at which he touches upon the parable-form and analogical presentation as having a value beyond the purely rational which might be more widely illustrated.

The distinctions involved are carefully worked out first by an examination of Bultmann's position and terminology. A sensible questioning of Bultmann's basis in several points is perhaps overdue and a re-evaluation of his method of Gospel criticism. Some vulnerable points here dealt with are his concentration on the Pauline commentary rather than on the Synoptics, the substitution of anthropology for theology, and his distinction between fact and meaning, between "historical" (*historisch*, i.e., observed event) and "historic" (*geschichtlich*, i.e., history with contemporary impact). This sort of historical agnosticism itself needs debunking and nowhere so much as in connection with Christianity. The liberal "Jesus of history" has been debunked long ago but historical criticism of the New Testament produces something other than either that figment or the figment of an existentialist Christ. At more than one point throughout the book Jones shows that the mythological mode of expression is concerned to illuminate an historically conditioned experience rather than to present a mythical ontology or cosmology.

In examining the key Christological passages the author points out the mythological elements involved (pre-existence, co-creation, descending Logos or Son of Man, kenosis, spatial and temporal metaphors). The blend of Old Testament thought and Hellenistic religious philosophy is clear. Its distance from modern ways of thinking is also obvious. The problem of "demything," however, is "how is it to be so interpreted that it can lose its mythological content without sacrificing its essential meaning?" (p. 105). The author's attempts to present Heim's and Thornton's reinterpretations, though bravely done, lead one to the observation that on the whole the New Testament expressions taken metaphorically lead to more immediate understanding and make for more immediate (existential) impact that the convolutions of modern philosophical categories.

The substantial and deeply interesting section of the book is Part

Three. That the Lordship of Christ is an experienced fact can hardly be denied. The term itself is not necessarily mythical but its context is. The attempts to apply the help of emergent evolution and religious culmination do not really satisfy the New Testament facts, though the ideas of creativity, and continuity-discontinuity may help explain the uniqueness of Jesus (if hardly the "numinous" element).

The most difficult points have to do with cosmic salvation and the victory over evil. These are frankly faced and real problems emerge. (In dealing with Romans 8 I feel his exegesis has taken insufficient account of redeemed man as the expression of redeemed creation and his role, within limits, in redeeming his environment). It is particularly helpful to find a trenchant criticism of the too-readily accepted D-day metaphor. The objective content and fact of evil are faced as stubborn realities. The essential kerygmatic fact is the encounter between a man-ward movement from God and a God-ward movement from man found in Jesus as Lord in which the initiative on God's side is met by man's acceptance. This is much more vividly presented in the metaphorically taken mythological terminology of the New Testament than in the abstractions into which attempts to restate it in modern form lead with monotonous regularity.

There are many fine things in the book which deserve comment if space permitted (e.g., treatment of the Cross, of the Virgin Birth and the real difference in relation to myth between the Protestant and Catholic traditions). There are also some minor things to question. Does source-criticism permit us to attribute the word about Jonah and the whale to Jesus? Must we approve Hoskyns and Davies' dictum in Appendix I that there are no "assured results" of New Testament criticism? There are occasional misprints. The absence of the idea of pre-existence from the Synoptics—with the exception of a possible interpretation of the term "Son of Man"—is properly emphasized.

But the valuable part of the book, resting as it does on the extended discussion, is the concluding part. To some demythologizers the "fundamental affirmation" of the gospel is what is unacceptable, not its mythological presentation. A premature abandonment of at least metaphorical expression fairly obviously leads to the dissolution of Christianity into either metaphysics or ethics. It is the distinctly religious experience which is transmitted by mythological thinking and this is only with difficulty conveyed in any other way—especially to the general public untrained in sustained abstract thought. The abandonment of ancient cosmology is overdue and mythical categories of the ancient

world need not be taken as authoritative except by biblical literalists. We are not adept at the creation of mythological language ourselves and our task would seem to be either the discovery of potent and (existentially) effective metaphorical terms or the rehabilitation of the New Testament analogues. They have, as Jones emphatically points out, a value as norms and archetypes which force the interpreters of each generation back to the central experience. We cannot, in the existential situation in which we have experienced that to which they point, so "reduce" the archetypes that they deny the fact which alone prompts our interest in them. The author's final words are perhaps necessary. "The unchanging substance is the New Testament affirmation that Jesus is Lord."

The New Testament scholar will find great value in this book and so should the theologian. But it ought not to be neglected by the preacher and certainly not by the teachers of preachers.

CHARLES W. F. SMITH

No Cross, No Crown. By William J. Wolf. Doubleday, 1957, pp. 216. \$3.00.

This book is a comprehensive, interpretative summary of the doctrine of the Atonement from biblical days to the present. Its title is truly indicative of its contents, for the book attempts to give the basic relationship of the Cross to the Crown—as well as man's double and simultaneous relationship to each. This double relationship of man to Cross and Crown gives rise to one of the basic problems of the Atonement, viz., the present-future aspect of man's salvation. The approach recommended by Professor Wolf to his subject is definitely a biblical one, but one which illustrates biblical theology at its best. That is to say, the author recognizes both that biblical unity on the subject of the Atonement is a "complex type of unity" at best and that biblical theology itself cannot properly exist apart from the historical interpretations made of the Bible throughout the ages. This latter is the case because, as time and thought go on, men continue to find new insights in historic events which themselves are simply past.

It is pointed out that the biblical view of salvation is a corporate one. This leads to a discussion of man's vicarious experience, and this, in turn, leads to a consideration of social *identification*—which involves both oneness and difference. The Incarnation and Atonement are held to be historical facts of the historical Person, Jesus. There-

fore, this presentation is a truly *Christian* one; we are presented with a view of Christ, not merely with a view of other men's views of Christ. This is the historic Christian faith, not "a new faith in other men's faith" (p. 53).

Jesus is God's *love* acting in history. He is our substitute, and His act is *sacrificial*. The latter term is a crucial and key term for the author; in this respect, his case rests largely upon the work of Vincent Taylor. From the view that the Son "is what he does and does what he is," is rightly concluded that any adequate consideration of the Incarnation and Atonement cannot think of the two events as related to each other in an either/or manner. Each necessarily involves the other.

Critical summaries of various theories of the Atonement then follow, classified under the major headings of *Greek*, *Latin*, *Reformation*, *Moral Influence*, and *Other*. Anselm's "satisfaction theory" comes in for especially critical handling. No one can deny that the theory is inadequate for what it does not explicitly mention. But perhaps a bit more could have been said—in view of the treatment given to other acknowledgedly inadequate theories—to show that it is not worthless in what it does mention. That God is not a legalist in the pharisaical sense of the term does not require, of course, that he be antinomian. Anselm's views do not internally prohibit their being further qualified and enriched in terms of love and personal relationships by his successors.

In Christ's atoning act God redeems man's past, present, and future. This action is seen in "deliverance from the burden of guilt," "being justified by faith," and "the promise of sanctification." All of these actions can be found in all three temporal dimensions, but Professor Wolf's discussion in Chapter VII of the redemption of the past by deliverance from guilt is especially incisive and rewarding.

The author concludes with a good evaluation of the *I-Thou* theology of Martin Buber. The reviewer, however, has some difficulty with certain of the remarks of Professor Wolf concerning God's attributes. An explication of love of the type needed to justify the statement, "The only way through that old battle of the attributes is to hold the supremacy of love . . ." is lacking (p. 195). Nothing is said of the analogical nature of love in God. In addition, considerable explication should be given to show the consistency of the author's double contention that God is not finite (urged against the views of Brightman, p. 201) and that God is nevertheless *possible* (cf. p. 197). Notwithstanding such questions as these, this book offers a well-balanced and valuable introduction to the Atonement.

ARTHUR A. VOGEL

Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy. By Richard Kroner. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956, pp. 251. \$5.75.

Dr. Kroner is a distinguished German philosopher who has made America his home for the past sixteen years, teaching principally at Union Theological Seminary and at the School of Theology of Temple University. He was professor of philosophy at Kiel until the Nazis took over, for many years editor of the periodical *Logos*, and the author of seven works in German, including a two-volume study *Von Kant bis Hegel* (1921-24). His first three works in English form, as he says (in the Preface to his Gifford Lectures), are "a kind of trilogy that might be entitled: The Boundary Line between Philosophy and Religion." They are *The Religious Function of Imagination* (1941), *How Do We Know God* (1943), and the Gifford Lectures, *The Primacy of Faith* (1943). Subsequently he published *Culture and Faith*, and with the present volume embarks upon a three volume study of speculation and revelation in the pre-Christian, medieval-Christian, and modern periods in the history of philosophy.

This common division into periods illustrates, on Dr. Kroner's view, the thesis of this book: "that it is the relation between speculation and revelation, or between the secular and the sacred approach to the Ultimate or the Absolute, which determines the character of philosophic systems" (p. 10). The pursuit of this theme makes of the study of Greek philosophy herein a unified and artistic whole. The opening chapters discuss the nature of speculation and its relation to revelation, and the way in which the relation of the two provides the perspective from which the history of philosophy is viewed and its periods evaluated. There follows then a chapter on speculation and the Greek mind, showing its relation to religion and to politics, and arguing that the basic attitude of the Greek mind was aesthetic (here he respectfully disagrees with Werner Jaeger, whose judgments he endorses at other points), that it was and remained natural, naive, sensuous, that its ultimate value was beauty. In a chapter on preparation of the Gospel it is shown how Greek philosophy brought about the destruction of popular religion while at the same time with naive audacity it discovered the limits to which the human mind could go in unveiling the hidden truth of the divine. "Thus it had to fail in the end" (p. 61).

The documentation of this position takes us through the history of Greek philosophy. Certain aspects of the treatment may be pointed out. In the case of the pre-Socratics the interpretation is like that of Jaeger and counter to that which sees them as "naturalists" or "phy-

sicists" or the like. There is a critical evaluation of Aristotle's discussion of these thinkers, and of its distorting effect upon subsequent histories of philosophy. The prominence unjustifiably given to the ideas of flux and stability in Heraclitus and Parmenides is traced to the fact that their (lesser) successors tried to harmonize them at this point, doing so by what Kroner characterizes as a "ruse." The consequence of the "agony that metaphysics suffered with the Atomists" was the Sophistic movement. At this point, however, appeared the unique and mysterious figure of Socrates. Here Dr. Kroner disagrees with A. E. Taylor and others. He sees in Socrates a prototype of the modern existentialist, and does not believe that he originated the Ideas. "If this picture is correct, we cannot assume that the man who strictly denied that he had any definite theory or metaphysics would have generated it nevertheless; this would undo the earnestness of his frequent remarks, agreeing so well with the whole impression of his attitude." (Hence the *Phaedo* is a later, not an earlier, dialogue.) The picture of Socrates, then, is that of the discoverer of a new dimension of the human soul (the moral conscience) and a new approach to the mystery of existence (the inner conversation of the soul), not a formulator of philosophic doctrine. One may use the word to designate Socrates' belief that virtue can be taught, that no one does wrong voluntarily (i.e., no one does evil for the sake of evil), and that goodness and happiness are one. But the philosophic doctrine in the strict sense belongs to Plato, to whom is devoted a long chapter showing (among other things) why he has always been so attractive to Christian thinkers. Finally, we have an account of the consummation of Greek thought in Aristotle, the heir of all the aspects and problems of Greek thought to his day, and a chapter on speculation and religion in Stoicism which concludes with a discussion of Philo, in whom Greek speculation and Biblical revelation met for the first time. In the breakdown of speculation after Aristotle Dr. Kroner observes the inevitable result of all man's cultural striving: the reaching of a high point, and then disintegration.

This is a weighty and significant volume, and should find a cordial welcome especially among Christian teachers of philosophy and theology. And it should be said that the author has achieved an English style not often equalled by philosophers whose mother tongue it is.

JOHN E. SKINNER, H. G.

Religion and the Christian Faith. By Hendrik Kraemer. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. vi + 461 pp. \$6.00.

The name of Hendrik Kraemer requires no introduction in missionary and ecumenical circles, in view of his important contributions as a thinker, scholar and ecumenical leader. By training he is an Orientalist, and by profession he occupied for many years the chair of History of Religions in the University of Leiden. He became famous for *The Christian Message in A Non-Christian World* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1938), which was characterized as a European Barthian Answer to *Re-Thinking Missions* (Harper, 1932), a product of American liberalism. Recalling what he wrote in 1938, Kramer states in the present volume:

I made then the point that missions, and the problem of how to define the relation of the Christian faith to the non-Christian religions, are only put in their right place when seen in the light of the wider and deeper problem of the Church's relations to the world and *all* its sources of life. Because the Church has a divine mission and a divine commission, or, to express it differently: divine mission and divine commission are the two symbolic aspects of the Church's real nature and reason of existence (p. 31).

How does Kraemer feel about the nature of the world in which we live today? (1) The Christian religion is no longer in any sense an uncontested, established entity in its own historical domain. (2) The "scientific" temper of modern man induces an attitude of detachment; the historical temper, one of relativism. (3) Never before in history have we known so much *about* religion and religions as we do at the moment. Yet, the present cultural climate accepts the fact of *religious pluralism*. (4) The Christian Church is today challenged by the existence and vitality of the non-Christian religions; we are *en route* to a new encounter of cultures, philosophies and religions. (5) The peoples of Africa and Asia have regained their political independence, "Westernization" has now become a means to their own ends, and no longer a tool in the hands of their rulers. The religious and cultural "revival" is therefore rooted in political soil. (6) It is evidence of a divine providence that through the patient persistent work of the Science of Religion, we have a good instrument for a more adequate and intelligent understanding of religion and religions, and also a precious help towards arriving at an intelligent judgment. (7) The missionary obligation of the Church means to announce, to transmit, to convey the message of God's great acts for the redemption of man and the

world—a seemingly bigoted claim that there is no salvation in any other than in Christ (pp. 21-30).

One is impressed by Kraemer's ability to pack in one book biblical theology, church history, science of religion, *Missionswissenschaft*, and apologetic theology. Inevitably, however, what Kraemer calls "Biblical epistemology" (p. 450), with which he evaluates and judges religions of the world, is based solely on Western philosophical tradition. Thus, his analysis and judgment of Hinduism, for instance, brilliant though it is, nevertheless is another form of "mock-fights" (p. 27), about which he is strongly critical. In fact, the only non-Christian thinker whom Kraemer takes seriously throughout the book is Radhakrishnan. Kraemer rightly raises questions about the nature of Radhakrishnan's attempt to restate the basic principles of Hinduism by asking "what is the real concern of this restatement: adaptation at any cost, or the concern about Truth? and how far is it creative reinterpretation?" (p. 126). But a Christian apologetic theology, if it takes seriously its vocation to communicate to non-Christians according to Kraemer's own principle, is compelled to encounter an equally ticklish problem. Dare we ask Dr. Kraemer to develop this theme in another book?

JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Der Stil der Jüdisch-Hellenistischen Homiletik. By Hartwig Thyen. Göttingen; Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1955. pp. 130 (=Forschungen zur Religion und Lit. des A. und N. T., Neue Folge, 47). 9.80 German marks (about \$2.40).

Since it is one of the fundamental tenets of form-criticism that the preaching of the early Church was the *Sitz im Leben* of much of the material now in the NT, and since early Christianity undoubtedly spread through the synagogues of the diaspora, the question "What were the sermons in these synagogues actually like?" is obviously of great importance for NT criticism as well as for

the history of Judaism. In the present work—originally a doctoral thesis at Marburg—Dr. Thyen lists a number of writings which have been thought remains of such sermons (more or less reworked) and discusses their style. The works listed are "Philo's allegorical commentary on Genesis," I Clement, IV Maccabees, James, Hebrews, the speech of Stephen (Acts 7: 2-53), Didache 1-6 and 16, Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas (excluding the narrative portions), the long speeches of moral counsel in Tobit, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and The Wisdom of Solomon (especially the second half, which is

thought the original work of an Alexandrian preacher). The discussion of style first attempts to show the influence, on these works, of the form of the Cynico-Stoic diatribe (in this respect the book is deliberately a complement and continuation of Bultmann's *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt*, which was vol. 13 of the same series). Next it discusses the use of the OT in these works and then the forms given to paraenetic material. The discussions are sensible and admirably clear, and the conclusions are usually supported by adequate references to some of the texts chosen as examples of the form. But these examples are not perfectly consistent, and it occasionally happens that all or most of the references for a particular point refer to a single one or group of the examples. Thus I have the impression, perhaps mistaken, that many of the parallels to the cynico-stoic diatribes are found only, or almost only, in Philo, James and IV Maccabees. Too often, the argument seems based on the tacit supposition that one style of sermon was consistently affected throughout diasporic Judaism. Also, the author explicitly supposes (p.5) that this "hellenistic" tradition is to be contrasted with a quite different "Palestinian" one, which he does not discuss. The danger of this tacit assumption is shown by the inclusion of The Testaments of the XII Patriarchs, undoubtedly Palestinian and typically Hellenistic among the examples of the hellenistic, rather than the Palestinian, tradition. (On the other hand, it is just as well that the author did not attempt to discuss the rabbinic material, since he supposes that its homiletic elements are "etwa talmudische Traktate"—p. 28.) Apart from these points, the major fault of the book is its frequent neglect of important works on the subjects dealt with. Fortunately, this does not affect its main

value, which is that of a useful collection of stylistic data.

M. S.

Die Gnosis in Korinth. By Walter Schmitthals. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1956, pp. 257 (Forschungen zur Rel. u. Lit. des A. u. N. T., NF 48). 22.40 German Marks (= about \$5.00).

This work attempts to infer, from Paul's letters to the Corinthians, the theology and practices of his opponents, and to base on these inferences further arguments as to the early history of gnosticism. Unfortunately, the whole work is built on the presupposition that in Corinth there were only two parties—one, that of the conventional Christians (who might call themselves after various teachers, but were an undivided group), the other, that of the gnostics (who claimed to be "of Christ"). This not only contradicts the plain sense of 1:10 ff., but also involves the author in a desperate effort to refer almost everything in the letters to a single gnostic sect. To save himself, he resorts to the supposition that Paul was misinformed about this sect. Therefore, when the doctrines attacked are those which gnostics could not have held, that reflects Paul's misinformation or misunderstanding, and when nothing is said of doctrines which gnostics would probably have held, that reflects Paul's ignorance. The potentialities of this method are obvious. Nevertheless, many difficulties remain. These are often met with equal intellectual ingenuity: a few passages of the exegesis are really brilliant and the objections to conventional views are often quite acute. Anyone who attempts a detailed study of the Corinthian correspondence will do well to check his interpretation of each passage against that of this book, but for a general picture of what was going on in Corinth—to say nothing of the larger question

of the pre-history of gnosticism—it is more valuable for the problems it raises than for the solutions it presents.

M. S.

From the Stone Age to Christianity. By William Foxwell Albright. Second Edition with a new introduction by the Author. Doubleday, 1957, pp. 432. Paper, \$1.45.

The second edition of this work was published by the Johns Hopkins Press in 1946. Since that time there have appeared translations in German (1949), French (1951) and Hebrew (1953), each containing some revision and enlargement. In the introduction written for the present Doubleday Anchor Books edition, the author has described "the most important advances in the state of knowledge which affect the book as a whole" and has then taken up "each chapter in succession, indicating the kind of revision or expansion which I should like to incorporate in a rewritten text". His discussion deals both with new information and archaeological discoveries, and with recent thought on historiography and the philosophy of history. The concluding section sketches very briefly the position which the Qumran material has led Professor Albright to take: ". . . . the New Testament proves to be in fact what it was formerly believed to be: teaching of Christ and his immediate followers between cir. 25 and cir. 80 A. D."

When Egypt Ruled the East. By George Steindorff and Keith C. Steele. Second Edition Revised by Keith C. Steele. University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 289, 109 illustrations. \$5.75.

The first edition was published in 1942. The present revision takes advantage of many of the advances in Egyptological knowledge during the intervening fifteen years. The period covered in detail is

that from Thutmose I to Ramesses III. This edition, like the first, is handsomely printed on glossy paper, with a profusion of excellent illustrations.

Early Latin Fathers (The Library of Christian Classics Volume V) Selections from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, and Jerome. Translated and edited by S. L. Greenslade. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956, pp. 415. \$5.00.

In Volume V of the *Library of Christian Classics* Professor Greenslade continues to display the grasp of ancient church history in its bearing on modern church life which he has shown in previous studies. One should note however that the volume is not precisely what the title would lead one to expect. "Early Latin Theology" would suggest the theological writings of the pre-Augustinian Latin Fathers—Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, and the much-neglected Hilary. Greenslade argues, however, that the specific Latin interest in theology was in the Church, in theory and practice, and gives us selections bearing in this theme, all familiar but deserving his new and attractive presentation. The emphasis thus falls on Polity and Moral Theology rather than on Dogmatics. Tertullian is represented by his treatises On Prescription Against Heretics and On Idolatry, Cyprian by writings on the unity of the Church, on the treatment of the lapsed, and on the baptismal controversy, Ambrose and Jerome by selections from their letters. Those of Ambrose illuminate various conflicts in Church and State, while Jerome's deal with standards of clerical and ascetic life, and with his views on church order, at times papalist, at others presbyterian. There would still be a place, I think, for the book Green-sla-de decided not to write, but the one he has given us on the Early Latin Church is welcome. It will be of value

to scholars and students in the field, and should be of interest to the intelligent lay reader concerned with what the experience of the Church in the past may have to say to the Church of today as it faces related though not identical problems.

E. R. H.

Tertullian, The Treatise Against Hermogenes (Ancient Christian Writers No. 24). Translated and Annotated by J. H. Waszink. Westminster: Newman Press, 1956, pp. vi-178. \$3.25.

With the distinguished scholarship we have come to expect in the series of *Ancient Christian Writers*, Professor Waszink of Leyden has given us a new and admirable translation of a relatively brief but by no means unimportant treatise of Tertullian. As a classicist Professor Waszink confines himself mainly to establishing and interpreting the text, which in Tertullian's works is no small task, leaving theological and historical interpretation to others. The special importance of the treatise is its formal establishment of the principle of creation *ex nihilo*, Hermogenes, an otherwise obscure thinker, having attempted to resolve various problems by expounding the idea that the Creator worked on pre-existent matter. Tertullian's reply therefore established an important point in Christian philosophy. It has perhaps been neglected because it stands apart from the fascinating controversies to which so much of his work was devoted, and an up-to-date scholarly edition is therefore particularly welcome.

E. R. H.

Athenagoras: Embassy for Christians, the Resurrection of the Dead. Translated and annotated by Joseph Hugh Crehan, S. J. (*Ancient Christian Writers*, vol. 23) Westminster: Newman, 1956, pp. 193. \$3.25.

This volume is devoted to two short works. The text of the *Embassy* takes

only fifty pages of large print; the *Resurrection* a mere thirty-seven. Fr. Crehan has given a pleasant and lively translation, and both works can be quickly and easily read.

The *Embassy* is a typical enough Early Christian "apology." The use of arguments drawn from Plato add to its interest. In the *Resurrection*, Athenagoras emphasizes two main points: the uniqueness of the constituents of each individual's body, and the essential unity of body and soul in man's nature. He is determined to give a scientific refutation of the old objection that the same organic material can successively form part of more than one person's body and therefore none would have a right to it at the resurrection. In a luridly entertaining passage, Athenagoras shows that although a cannibal may devour and actually digest another man, nevertheless the elements essential to the bodily structure of the victim are not actually assimilated into the body of his consumer. He will admit, apparently, that the liquids of the body may pass from one to another, but these "humors" will not be needed by us in the resurrection.

In the introduction, Fr. Crehan shows that there is some respectable evidence after all to favor the old tradition that Athenagoras was head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. Crehan's vindication of the apologist's orthodoxy is scarcely subtle, and his attempts to find liturgical evidence in Athenagoras is unimpressive. The rather full index deserves praise.

H. B. P., JR.

A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham. Vol. X of *The Library of Christian Classics*. Edited and translated by Eugene R. Fairweather. Westminster, 1956, pp. 457. \$5.00.

Being the tenth volume in the *Library of Christian Classics*, the contents of

this book must be viewed in their relation to the series as a whole. This done, no one can deny the balanced and scholarly job which Professor Fairweather has done in editing this volume. The book divides into three sections, each shorter than the preceding: the first deals primarily with Anselm of Canterbury, the second deals with "Theologians of the Twelfth Century," and the third deals with Franciscan thought in "The Thirteenth Century and After."

The readable translations of Anselm alone would more than justify this book in its entirety. However, the introductions and bibliographies of the editor call for special mention. The general introduction, at the least, outlines a course of studies—and more properly, if the footnotes are followed up—supplies material enough for a whole program of studies. A general bibliography follows. In addition, there are more specialized introductions and bibliographies of equal merit to each one of the three divisions. The whole book allows the utmost ease of reference, which fact can also be illustrated from the three indexes at the end: there is a General Index of historical names and subjects, an index of Modern Authors, and one of Biblical References. It is certainly true, as the book jacket remarks, that "this volume brilliantly illustrates the principal interests of the great scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages. . . ."

A. A. V.

Reformation Writings of Martin Luther.
Translated with introduction and notes by Bertram Lee Woolf. Vol. II, "The Spirit of the Protestant Reformation." Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 340. \$7.50.

The second of Dr. Woolf's translations of selections from Luther emphasizes writings from 1519 to 1521. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the volume is the presentation in English of various

sources recording what Luther said and did at the crucial appearance before the emperor and Diet at Worms, especially when those documents are understood in connection with three sermons (here translated) preached shortly before that appearance. Included also are the "Magnificat" and a number of important biblical prefaces, as well as the 1525 preface to the Lord's Supper and Order of Divine Service. The other pieces in the book are the Fourteen Comforts, Luther's explanation of the burning of papal books, and the Word to Penitents. The work is valuable not only for the clarity of its translating, but also for adequacy of scholarly paraphernalia.

W. A. C. . .

Anglicanism. The Thought and Practice of the Church of England, Illustrated from the Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century. Compiled and Edited by the late Paul Elmer More and Frank Leslie Cross. Macmillan, 1957, pp. 811. \$6.75.

The indispensable source book first published in 1935 and reprinted in 1951, now reprinted again. No change has been made from the first edition. A comparison of the present printing with a copy of the first edition shows that the print is still as black and sharp as it was originally. It is good to have the volume available again.

Light and Enlightenment. By Rosalie Colie. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. xiii + 162. \$3.75.

The subtitle of this book, *A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the Dutch Arminians*, gives a more accurate account of its subject matter. Miss Colie has given us a very interesting treatment of the relations between Henry More and Ralph Cudworth on the English side, and the Dutch Remonstrants Limborch and Le Clerc on the other. In treating the common opposition of these two groups

to the materialistic tendencies of the Cartesian philosophy, the writings of Hobbes and the philosophy of Spinoza, the author makes clear the superior originality of the Englishmen. Teasing references are made to the dependence of John Locke upon the Dutch Arminians for many of his ideas, and to the room left by the philosophy of these related groups for the development of Deism, but these topics are not developed.

Miss Colie has done a worthwhile service in pointing out the interrelations of these interesting thinkers. Her use of unnoticed source materials is admirable. One hopes that this book will be followed by others fulfilling the promises made within it.

L. L. B.

Thine is the Kingdom. The Church's Mission in our Time. By J. S. Stewart. Scribner, 1957, pp. 74. \$2.50.

"This little book on the theme of missionary motivation is based on lectures recently delivered . . . It does not attempt anything so ambitious as to sketch a theology of missions. What I have tried to do is to outline one particular path towards such a theology and to indicate certain basic prolegomena for the quest" (from the Preface). The treatment is stimulating and suggestive. The thesis is that the missionary enterprise is of the essence of the Church, an implicate of every item of the Creed, and an integral part of the Christian understanding of history.

A Rauschenbusch Reader. The Kingdom of God and the Social Gospel. Compiled by Benson Y. Landis. With an Interpretation of the Life and Work of Walter Rauschenbusch by Harry Emerson Fosdick. Harper, 1957, pp. xxii 167. \$3.00.

This reader contains large portions of three books: *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (1907), *Christianizing the Social*

Order (1912), and *A Theology for the Social Gospel* (1917). A Social Litany is printed in full, and there are also representative quotations from *The Social Principles of Jesus* (1916) and from the booklet *Dare We Be Christians* (1914). Other quotations are given from Rauschenbusch's writings on devotion and personal faith and from his contributions to the Baptist Congress between 1889 and 1898.

Dr. Landis has provided explanations of the source and the context of the selections [of the source and the context of the selections] published before each selection and has done some abridging and combining. (The words of the selections are entirely those of Rauschenbusch.) The terse characterizations of the period in which the book quoted was written are fascinating, and the editing is skilfully done.

Dr. Fosdick's essay manages in nine pages to convey a good deal of information and a clear impression of Rauschenbusch. He provides also a balanced evaluation of the man's thought and life that is in its own way a helpful introduction to the selections.

The number of pages is misleading: they are closely printed (though clear and readable) and the margins are on the slim side, so that a page runs to slightly over five hundred words. So we have been provided a generous sample of Rauschenbusch, in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of his first major work.

Buddhism: A 'Mystery Religion'? By Paul Levy. New York: John de Graff; London: The Athlone Press, 1957, pp. vi + III.

Since World War II, a great many books have been published on world religions. However, it is seldom that we find a useful small book that is mature

in scholarship and well balanced in contents. Professor Levy's new book belongs to this category. The author is well versed in the literature on Buddhism, and he has had first-hand experience in Southeast Asia.

By depending heavily on ethnographic insights Levy examines the ordination rites of the Theravadan and Mahayana schools of Buddhism. From this standpoint, he rightly stresses the importance of extra-canonical observances. Significantly, he finds in the ordination rites many acts and prescribed forms which are remarkable for their violence. The important question is whether or not these acts were transmitted from primitive Buddhism. It is Levy's conclusion that the theme of the First Council of Rajagrha foreshadowed the later ordination rites, and that Ananda, the St. John of Buddhism, was the "prototype of the candidate for ordination."

Whether or not one agrees with Levy's contention that Buddhism shares the essential qualities of the so-called "Mystery Religions" (Chapter VI), readers will be amply rewarded by the author's careful scholarship and imaginative analysis of Buddhist rites, which have been neglected by scholars who are preoccupied with the philosophical aspects of this great religion.

J. M. K.

Prayer and Personal Religion. By John B. Coburn. Westminster Press, 1957, pp. 96. \$1.00.

Life, Death, and Destiny. By Roger L. Shinn. Westminster Press, 1957, pp. 95. \$1.00.

Two further issues in the "Layman's Theological Library" edited by Robert McAfee Brown. These are up to the high standard set by their predecessors. Terse, fresh and to the point. Considering their brevity, it is a little surprising that there are no 'suggestions for further reading'.

John Coburn has been Dean of Trinity Cathedral, Newark, since 1953, becomes Dean of the Episcopal Theological School this Fall. Roger Shinn is Professor of Theology at the Vanderbilt University Divinity School.

Hooker's Theology of Common Prayer. The Fifth Book of the Polity Paraphrased and Expanded into a Commentary on the Prayer Book. By John S. Marshall. University of the South Press, 1956, pp. viii + 186. Paper, \$2.50, Cloth \$4.00.

Professor Marshall's *Hooker's Polity in Modern English* (Sewanee, 1948) provided a handy reference to a number of key passages from most of the books of the *magnum opus* of that great Anglican divine. The present work is drawn almost wholly from book V, but whereas the former was "abridged and paraphrased" this is also amended, expanded and interpolated. The revision in method is necessary to make the essentially polemical argument of that book into a calm and reasoned liturgical commentary. That this work does not get the spirit and thought of Hooker into modern idiom as successfully as did the other seems due to nature of the material rather than any relaxation of the author's labors. That side of Hooker which reflected Aristotle and late scholasticism is here turned more to the front than is the side which reflected Luther and the Reformation.

W. A. C.

North Country Bishop: A Biography of William Nicolson. By Francis G. James. Yale University Press, 1956, pp. xiv + 330. 4.50.

The author has done an outstanding job of presenting a colorful account of the life and ministry of an English clergyman and bishop with accurate attention to detail. One is helped to understand the daily life of the Church in

the north of England, because the author takes pains to explain many terms and customs unfamiliar to American readers. Local history comes to life as Nicolson's diary and letters are exploited to let us see him in action as Archdeacon and Bishop of Carlisle in the exciting and dangerous times covering the last two decades of the 17th and first two of the 18th centuries. Although less space is given to Nicolson's Irish career as Bishop of Derry, the author takes pains to present the situation of the Irish Church clearly and, on the whole, rather fairly. One small defect James' book shares with most ecclesiastical biographies of the period: too much concern centers around trying to discover how much of a Whig or a Tory Nicolson is at any given moment, and the relationship of his politics to his churchmanship. Like Compton, Nicolson voted and worked with his eyes well open, as his judgment dictated, with party attachments a secondary consideration.

L. L. B.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Christian Theology and Natural Science. By E. L. Mascall. The Ronald Press Company, 1957. Reviewed in the October, 1946, number as a publication of Longmans, Green & Co. of London.

The Core of the Bible. From the Authorized King James Version, arranged by Austin Farrer. Harper, 1957, pp. 156. Paper, \$95.

The Essence of Christianity. By Ludwig Feuerbach. Translated by George Eliot. Introduction by Karl Barth,

Foreword by H. R. Niebuhr. Harper, 1957, pp. xliv 339. Paper, \$1.45.

The Tragic Philosopher. A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche. By F. E. Lea. Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 354. \$6.00.

Spinoza: The Road to Inner Freedom (The Ethics). Edited and with an Introduction by Dagobert D. Runes. Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 215. \$3.00.

Interpretations of Poetry and Religion. By George Santayana. Harper, 1957, pp. 290. Paper, \$1.45.

Albert Schweitzer. The Story of His Life. By Jean Pierhal. Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 160. \$3.00.

The Angels and Their Mission, according to the Fathers of the Church. By Jean Danielou. Translated from the French by David Heimann. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1957, pp. 118. \$2.75.

Extinct Languages. By Johannes Friederich. Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 182. \$5.00.

An account of the extinct languages of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, and of their decipherment.

Proceedings, Second Annual Convention of the Society of Catholic College Teachers of Sacred Doctrine. Washington: Dunbarton College of the Holy Cross, 1956.

Are You Looking for God? Sermons by Edmund A. Steinle. Muhlenburg Press, 1957, pp. 154. \$2.25.

Oriental Magic. By Sayed Idries Shah. Foreword by Louis Marin. Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 206, illustrations. \$7.50.

A Note by the Editors

THE ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW is now in its thirty-ninth volume. For forty years it has been an unofficial organ of the colleges and theological seminaries of the Protestant Episcopal Church. It has been supported, as a labor of love, by a group of the Church's scholars. Since its foundation, in 1918, it has never had, and has not now, any "overhead" of any kind—salaries, expense accounts, or staff. Its only expenses are for the printing and distribution of the REVIEW. Its resources include subscriptions, a small income from advertising (of theological seminaries), and annual cash contributions made by members of the Editorial Board and the Cooperating Institutions—eleven theological seminaries and four church colleges. Since 1927, Seabury-Western Theological Seminary has generously provided an office for the REVIEW. It has always been solvent, and continues solvent today, in spite of periods of inflation, depression, and general economic disturbance. It was founded during World War I, has survived World War II, and we hope to keep it going through the years to come.

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
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